Contact: guoyn.05@gmail.com

Office: Global Hub 3227
Research interests:

  • dynamic mechanism design
  • information design
  • communication and voting
Dynamic Delegation of Experimentation, American Economic Review, 2016, 106(8):1969-2008 (Lead article) [slides]
[Online appendix: optimal contract with transfers]

Modes of Persuasion Toward Unanimous Consent, Theoretical Economics, 2018, 13(3):1111-1150 (with Arjada Bardhi) [slides]

The Interval Structure of Optimal Disclosure, Econometrica, forthcoming (with Eran Shmaya, updated 12/2018, first draft 03/2017) [slides]
[Online appendix]

Working papers:
The Use and Misuse of Coordinated Punishments (with Daniel Barron, updated 01/2019) [Online appendix]

The Value of Multistage Persuasion (with Eran Shmaya, first draft 12/2018)

Costly Miscalibration (with Eran Shmaya, first draft 12/2017) [slides]

Private Learning and Exit Decisions in Collaboration (with Anne-Katrin Roesler)

Dynamic Allocation without Money (with Johannes Hörner, updated 07/2018)

Information Transmission and Voting, R&R Economic Theory (updated 10/2018)

NSF Grant SES-1530608 “Dynamic Mechanisms without Transfer” joint with Johannes Hörner (2015-2019)