Publications:
Dynamic Delegation of Experimentation, American Economic Review 2016, 106(8):1969-2008 [slides]
Online appendix: optimal contract with transfers

Modes of Persuasion Toward Unanimous Consent, forthcoming in Theoretical Economics (with Arjada Bardhi) [slides]

Working papers:
The Interval Structure of Optimal Disclosure, R&R Econometrica (with Eran Shmaya)

The Use and Abuse of Coordinated Punishments (with Daniel Barron, first draft 08/2018)

Costly Miscalibration (with Eran Shmaya, first draft 12/2017)

Private Learning and Exit Decisions in Collaboration (with Anne-Katrin Roesler)

Dynamic Allocation without Money (with Johannes Hörner, updated 07/2018)

Information Transmission and Voting, R&R Economic Theory (updated 06/2017)

Grant:
NSF Grant SES-1530608 “Dynamic Mechanisms without Transfer” joint with Johannes Hörner (2015-2018)