Contact: guoyn.05@gmail.com

Office: Global Hub 3227
Research interests:

  • dynamic mechanism design
  • information design
  • communication and voting
Dynamic Delegation of Experimentation, American Economic Review, 2016, 106(8):1969-2008 (Lead article) [slides]
[Online appendix: optimal contract with transfers]

Modes of Persuasion Toward Unanimous Consent, Theoretical Economics, 2018, 13(3):1111-1150 (with Arjada Bardhi) [slides]

The Interval Structure of Optimal Disclosure, Econometrica, 2019, 87(2):653-675 (with Eran Shmaya) [slides]
[Online appendix] [A continuous-type example]

Information Transmission and Voting, Economic Theory, 2019

Working papers:

Too Big for their Boots (with Daniel Barron and Bryony Reich, updated 06/2020) (NEW!)

The Use and Misuse of Coordinated Punishments (with Daniel Barron, updated 11/2019)

Robust Monopoly Regulation (with Eran Shmaya, updated 12/2019) [slides]

Costly Miscalibration (with Eran Shmaya, first draft 12/2017) R&R Theoretical Economics

The Value of Multistage Persuasion (with Eran Shmaya, first draft 12/2018)

Private Learning and Exit Decisions in Collaboration (with Anne-Katrin Roesler)

Dynamic Allocation without Money (with Johannes Hörner, updated 07/2018)

NSF Grant SES-1530608 “Dynamic Mechanisms without Transfer” joint with Johannes Hörner (2015-2019)