

Dynamic Mechanisms without Money ^{*}

Yingni Guo[†], Johannes Hörner[‡]

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Abstract

We analyze the optimal design of dynamic mechanisms in the absence of transfers. The designer uses future allocation decisions to elicit private information. Values evolve according to a two-state Markov chain. We solve for the optimal allocation rule. Unlike with transfers, efficiency decreases over time. In the long-run, polarization obtains, but not necessarily immiseration. A simple implementation is provided. The agent is endowed with a given “budget,” corresponding to a number of units he is entitled to claim in a row. Considering the limiting continuous-time environment, we show that persistence hurts.

Keywords: Mechanism design. Principal-Agent. Token mechanisms.

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1 Introduction

This paper is concerned with the dynamic allocation of resources when transfers are not allowed and information regarding their optimal use is private information to an individual. The informed agent is strategic rather than truthful.

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[†]Department of Economics, Northwestern University, 2001 Sheridan Rd., Evanston, IL 60201, USA, yingni.guo@northwestern.edu.

[‡]Yale University, 30 Hillhouse Ave., New Haven, CT 06520, USA, johannes.horner@yale.edu.

We are searching for the social choice mechanism that would bring us closest to efficiency. Here, efficiency and implementability are understood to be Bayesian: the individual and society understand the probabilistic nature of uncertainty and update based on it. Both the societal decision not to allow money –for economic, physical, legal or ethical reasons– and the sequential nature are assumed. Temporal constraints apply to the allocation of goods, such as jobs, houses or attention, and it is difficult to ascertain future demands.

Throughout, we assume that the good to be allocated is perishable.¹ Absent private information, the allocation problem is trivial: the good should be provided if and only if its value exceeds its cost.² However, in the presence of private information, and in the absence of transfers, linking future allocation decisions to current decisions is the only instrument available to society to elicit truthful information. Our goal is to understand this link.

Our main results are a characterization of the optimal mechanism and an intuitive indirect implementation for it. In essence, the agent should be granted an inside option, corresponding to a certain number of units of the good that he is entitled to receive “no questions asked.” This inside option is updated according to his choice: whenever the agent desires the unit, his inside option is reduced by one unit; whenever he forgoes it, it is revised according to his valuation for an incremental unit at the end of his “queue,” a valuation that depends on the length of the queue and the chain’s persistence. This results in simple dynamics: an initial phase of random length in which the efficient choice is made during each round, followed by an irreversible shift to one of the two possible outcomes in the game with no communication, namely, the unit is either always supplied or never supplied again.

These findings contrast with static design with multiple units (*e.g.*, Jackson and Sonnenschein, 2007), as the optimal mechanism isn’t a (discounted) quota mechanism as commonly studied in the literature: the order in the sequence of reports matters. By backloading inefficiencies, the mechanism takes advantage of the agent’s ignorance regarding future values, resulting in a convergence rate higher than under quota mechanisms. Backloading contrasts with the outcome with transfers (Battaglini, 2005). The long-run outcome, polarization, also differs from principal-agent models with risk-aversion (Thomas and Worrall, 1990).

Formally, our good can take one of two values during each round. Values are serially correlated over time. The binary assumption is certainly restrictive, but it is known that,

¹Many allocation decisions involve goods or services that are perishable, such as how a nurse or a worker should divide time; which patients should receive scarce medical resources (blood or treatments); or which investments and activities should be approved by a firm.

²This is because the supply of the perishable good is taken as given. There is a considerable literature on the optimal ordering policy for perishable goods, beginning with Fries (1975).

even with transfers, the problem becomes intractable beyond binary types (see Battaglini and Lamba, 2014).³ We begin with the i.i.d. case, which suffices to illustrate many of the insights of our analysis, before proving the results in full generality. The cost of providing the good is fixed and known. Hence, it is optimal to assign the good during a given round if and only if the value is high. We cast our problem of solving for the efficient mechanism (given the values, cost and discount factor) as one faced by a disinterested principal with commitment who determines when to supply the good as a function of the agent’s reports. There are no transfers, certification, or signals concerning the agent’s value, even *ex post*.

We demonstrate that the optimal policy can be implemented through a mechanism in which the appropriate currency is the number of units that the agent is entitled to receive sequentially with “no questions asked.” If the agent asks for the unit, his “budget” decreases by one; if he foregoes it, it increases by a factor proportional to the value of getting incremental units, *if he were to cash in all his units as fast as possible, with the incremental units last*. Such incremental units are especially valuable if his budget is large, as this makes his current type largely irrelevant to his expected value for these incremental units. Hence, an agent with a small budget must be paid more than an agent with a larger one.

This updating process is entirely independent of the principal’s belief concerning the agent’s type. The only role of the prior belief is to specify the initial budget. This budget mechanism is not a token mechanism in the sense that the total (discounted) number of units the agent receives is not fixed. Depending on the sequence of reports, the agent might ultimately receive few or many units.⁴ Eventually, the agent is either granted the unit forever or never again. Hence, polarization is ineluctable, but not immiseration.

We study the continuous time limit over which the flow value for the good changes according to a two-state Markov chain, and prove that efficiency decreases with persistence.

Allocation problems without transfers are plentiful. It is not our purpose to survey them. Our results can inform best practices concerning how to implement algorithms to improve allocations. For instance, consider nurses who must decide whether to take alerts triggered by patients seriously. The opportunity cost is significant. Patients, however, appreciate quality time with nurses irrespective of whether their condition necessitates it. This discrepancy produces a challenge with which every hospital must contend: ignore alarms and risk that a patient with a serious condition is not attended to, or heed all alarms and overwhelm the nurses. “Alarm fatigue” is a problem that health care must confront (see, *e.g.*, Sendelbach, 2012). We suggest the best approach for trading off the risks of neglecting a patient in need

³In Section 5.2, we consider the case of a continuum of types that are i.i.d. over time.

⁴It isn’t a bankruptcy mechanism (Radner, 1986) either, because the order of the report sequence matters.

and attending to one who simply cries wolf.⁵

Related Literature. Our work is closely related to the bodies of literature on mechanism design with transfers and on “linking incentive constraints.” Sections 3.4 and 4.5 are devoted to these and explain why transfers (resp., the dynamic nature of the relationship) matter.

Transfers: The obvious benchmark work that considers transfers is Battaglini (2005),⁶ who considers our general model but allows transfers. Another important difference is his focus on revenue maximization, a meaningless objective in the absence of prices.

Because of transfers, his results are diametrically opposed to ours. In Battaglini, efficiency improves over time (exact efficiency obtains eventually with probability 1). Here, efficiency decreases over time, with an asymptotic outcome that is at best the outcome of the static game. The agent’s utility can increase or decrease depending on the history: receiving the good forever is clearly his favorite outcome, while never receiving it again is the worst. Krishna, Lopomo and Taylor (2013) provide an analysis of limited liability (though transfers are allowed) in a model closely related to that of Battaglini, suggesting that excluding the possibility of unlimited transfers affects both the optimal contract and dynamics.⁷

Linking Incentives: This refers to the notion that as the number of identical decision problems increases, linking them allows to improve on the isolated problem. See Fang and Norman (2006) and Jackson and Sonnenschein (2007) for papers specifically devoted to this (see also Radner, 1981; Rubinstein and Yaari, 1983). Hortala-Vallve (2010) provides an analysis of the unavoidable inefficiencies that must be incurred away from the limit, and Cohn (2010) demonstrates the suboptimality of the mechanisms commonly used.

Unlike the bulk of this literature, we focus on the exactly optimal mechanism (for a fixed degree of patience). This allows us to identify results (backloading, for instance) that need not hold for other asymptotically optimal mechanisms, and to clarify the role of the dynamic structure. Discounting isn’t the issue; the fact that the agent learns the value of the units as they come is. Section 3.4 elaborates on the relationship between our results and theirs.

Dynamic Capital Budgeting: More generally, the notion that virtual budgets can be used as intertemporal instruments to discipline agents with private information has appeared in several papers in economics, within the context of games and principal-agent models.

⁵Clearly, our mechanism is much simpler than existing electronic nursing workload systems. However, none appears to seriously consider strategic agent behavior as a constraint.

⁶See also Zhang (2012) for an exhaustive analysis of Battaglini’s model as well as Fu and Krishna (2014).

⁷Note that there is an important exception to the quasi-linearity commonly assumed in the dynamic mechanism design literature, namely, Garrett and Pavan (2015).

Within the context of games, Möbius (2001) is the first to suggest that tracking the difference in the number of favors granted (with two agents) and using it to decide whether to grant new favors is a simple but powerful way of sustaining cooperation in long-run relationships.⁸ While his token mechanism is suboptimal, it has desirable properties: properly calibrated, it yields an efficient allocation as discounting vanishes. Hauser and Hopenhayn (2008) come the closest to solving for the optimal mechanism (within the class of PPE). Their analysis allows them to qualify the optimality of simple budget rules (according to which each favor is weighted equally, independent of the history), showing that this rule might be too simple (the efficiency cost can reach 30% of surplus). Their analysis suggests that the best equilibrium shares many features with the policy in our one-player world: the incentive constraint binds, and the efficient policy is followed unless it is inconsistent with promise keeping. Our model can be viewed as a game with one-sided incomplete information in which the production cost is known. There are some differences, however. First, our principal has commitment and hence is not tempted to act opportunistically. Second, he maximizes efficiency rather than his payoff.⁹ Li, Matouschek and Powell (2015) solve for the PPE in a model similar to our i.i.d. benchmark and allow for monitoring (public signals), demonstrating that better monitoring improves performance.

Some principal-agent models find that simple capital budgeting rules are exactly optimal in related models (*e.g.*, Malenko, 2013). Our results suggest how to extend such rules when values are persistent. Indeed, in our i.i.d. benchmark, the policy admits a simple implementation in terms of a dynamic two-part tariff. As simple as the implementation remains with Markovian types, it becomes then more natural to interpret the budget as an entitlement for consecutive units rather than a budget with a “fixed” currency value.

More generally, that allocation rights to other (or future) units can be used as a “currency” to elicit private information has long been recognized. Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979) first explain how this can be viewed as a pseudo-market. Casella (2005) develops a similar idea within the context of voting rights. Miralles (2012) solves a two-unit version with general distributions, with both values being privately known at the outset. A dynamic two-period version of Miralles is analyzed by Abdulkadiroğlu and Loertscher (2007).

All versions considered in this paper would be trivial in the absence of imperfect observation of the values. If the values were perfectly observed, it would be optimal to assign the

⁸See also Athey and Bagwell (2001), Abdulkadiroğlu and Bagwell (2012) and Kalla (2010).

⁹There is also a technical difference: our limiting model in continuous time corresponds to the Markovian case in which flow values switch according to a Poisson process. In Hauser and Hopenhayn, the lump-sum value arrives according to a Poisson process, and the process is memoryless.

good if and only if the value is high. Due to private information, it is necessary to distort the allocation: after some histories, the good is provided independent of the report; after others, the good is never provided again. In this sense, the scarcity of goods provision is endogenously determined to elicit information. There is a large body of literature in operations research considering the case in which this scarcity is considered exogenous – there are only n opportunities to provide the good, and the problem is then when to exercise these opportunities. Important early contributions include Derman, Lieberman and Ross (1972) and Albright (1977). Their analyses suggest a natural mechanism that can be applied in our environment: the agent owns a number of “tokens” and uses them whenever he pleases.

Exactly optimal mechanisms have been computed in related environments. Frankel (2011) considers a variety of related settings. The most similar is his Chapter 2 analysis in which he also derives an optimal mechanism. While he allows for more than two types and actions, he restricts attention to the types that are serially independent over time (our starting point). More importantly, he assumes that the preferences of the agent are independent of the state, which allows for a drastic simplification of the problem. Gershkov and Moldovanu (2010) consider a dynamic allocation problem related to Derman, Lieberman and Ross in which agents possess private information regarding the value of obtaining the good. In their model, agents are myopic and the scarcity of the resource is exogenously assumed. In addition, transfers are allowed. They demonstrate that the optimal policy of Derman, Lieberman and Ross (which is very different from ours) can be implemented via appropriate transfers. Johnson (2014) considers a model that is more general than ours (he permits two agents and more than two types). Unfortunately, he does not provide a solution to his model.

A related literature considers optimal stopping without transfers; see, in particular, Kováč, Krähmer and Tatur (2014). This difference reflects the nature of the good, namely, whether it is perishable or durable. When only one unit is desired, this is a stopping problem. With a perishable good, a decision must be made at every round. As a result, incentives and the optimal contract have little in common. In the stopping case, the agent might have an option value to forgo the current unit if the value is low and future prospects are good. This is not the case here – incentives to forgo the unit must be endogenously generated via promises. In the stopping case, there is only one history that does not terminate the game. Here, policies differ not only in when the good is first provided but also thereafter.

Finally, while the motivations of the papers differ, the techniques for the i.i.d. benchmark that we use borrow numerous ideas from Thomas and Worrall (1990), as we explain in Section 3, and our intellectual debt cannot be overstated.

Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 solves the i.i.d. benchmark, introducing many

of the ideas of the paper, while Section 4 solves the general model, and develops an implementation for the optimal mechanism. Section 5 extends the results to cases of continuous time or continuous types. Section 6 concludes.

2 The Model

Time is discrete and the horizon infinite, indexed by $n = 0, 1, \dots$. There are two parties, a disinterested principal and an agent. During each round, the principal can produce an indivisible unit of a good at a cost $c > 0$. The agent's value (or *type*) during round n , v_n is a random variable that takes value l or h . We assume that $0 < l < c < h$ such that supplying the good is efficient if and only if the value is high, but the agent's value is always positive.

The value follows a Markov chain as follows:

$$\mathbf{P}[v_{n+1} = h \mid v_n = h] = 1 - \rho_h, \quad \mathbf{P}[v_{n+1} = l \mid v_n = l] = 1 - \rho_l,$$

for all $n \geq 0$, where $\rho_l, \rho_h \in [0, 1]$. The invariant probability of h is $q := \rho_l / (\rho_h + \rho_l)$. For simplicity, we assume that the initial value is drawn according to the invariant distribution, that is, $\mathbf{P}[v_0 = h] = q$. The (unconditional) expected value of the good is denoted $\mu := \mathbf{E}[v] = qh + (1 - q)l$. We make no assumptions regarding how μ compares to c .

Let $\kappa := 1 - \rho_h - \rho_l$ be a measure of the persistence of the Markov chain. Throughout, we assume that $\kappa \geq 0$ (or equivalently, $1 - \rho_h \geq \rho_l$); that is, the distribution over tomorrow's type conditional on today's type being h first-order stochastically dominates the distribution conditional on the type being l .¹⁰ Two interesting special cases occur when $\kappa = 1$ and $\kappa = 0$. The former corresponds to perfect persistence; the latter, to i.i.d. values, see Section 3.

Allowing for persistence is important for at least two reasons. First, it affects some of the results (some of the results in the i.i.d. case rely on martingale properties that do not hold with persistence) and suggests a way of implementing the optimal mechanism in terms of an inside option that cannot be discerned in the i.i.d. case.¹¹ Second, it allows a direct comparison with the results derived by Battaglini (2005)

The agent's value is private information. At the beginning of each round, the value is drawn and the agent is informed of it. The two parties are impatient and share a common

¹⁰The role of this assumption, which is commonly adopted in the literature, and what occurs in its absence, when values are negatively serially correlated, is discussed at the end of Sections 4.3 and 4.4.

¹¹There are well-known examples in the literature in which persistence changes results much more drastically than here, see for instance Halac and Yared (2015).

discount factor $\delta \in [0, 1)$.¹² To exclude trivialities, assume that $\delta > l/\mu$ and $\delta > 1/2$.

Let $x_n \in \{0, 1\}$ refer to the supply decision during round n ; *e.g.*, $x_n = 1$ means that the good is supplied during round n .

Our focus is on identifying the (constrained) efficient mechanism defined below. Hence, we assume that the principal internalizes both the cost of supplying the good and the value of providing it to the agent. We solve for the principal’s favorite mechanism.

Thus, given an infinite history $\{x_n, v_n\}_{n=0}^{\infty}$, the principal’s realized *payoff* is defined as:

$$(1 - \delta) \sum_{n=0}^{\infty} \delta^n x_n (v_n - c),$$

where $\delta \in [0, 1)$ is a discount factor. The agent’s realized *utility* is defined as follows:¹³

$$(1 - \delta) \sum_{n=0}^{\infty} \delta^n x_n v_n.$$

Throughout, payoff and utility refer to the expectation of these values. Note that the utility belongs to the interval $[0, \mu]$. The agent seeks to maximize expected utility.

We now introduce or emphasize several important assumptions maintained throughout.

- There are no transfers. This is our point of departure from Battaglini (2005) and most of dynamic mechanism design. Note also that our objective is efficiency, not revenue maximization. With transfers, there is a trivial mechanism that achieves efficiency: supply the good if and only if the agent pays a fixed price in the range (l, h) .
- There is no *ex post* signal regarding the realized value of the agent –the principal does not see realized payoffs. Depending on the context, it might be more realistic to assume that a signal of the value occurs at the end of a round, independent of the supply decision. In some other applications, it makes more sense to assume that this signal occurs only if the good is supplied (*e.g.*, a firm discovers the productivity of a worker who is hired). Conversely, statistical evidence might only occur from not supplying the good if supplying it averts a risk (a patient calling for care or police calling for backup). See Li, Matouschek and Powell (2014) for an analysis (with “public shocks”) in a related context. Presumably, the optimal policy differs according to the monitoring structure. Understanding what happens without *any* signal is the natural first step.

¹²The common discount factor is important. Yet, because we view our principal as a social planner trading off the agent’s utility with the social cost of providing the good as opposed to an actual player, it is natural to assume that her discount rate is equal to the agent’s.

¹³Throughout, the term payoff describes the principal’s objective and utility describes the agent’s.

- We assume that the principal commits *ex ante* to a (possibly randomized) mechanism. This assumption brings our analysis closer to the literature on dynamic mechanism design and distinguishes it from the literature on chip mechanisms (as well as Li, Matouschek and Powell, 2014), which assumes no commitment on either side and solves for the (perfect public) equilibria of the game.
- The good is perishable. Hence, previous choices affect neither feasible nor desirable future opportunities. If the good were durable and only one unit were demanded, the problem would be one of stopping, as in Kováč, Krähmer and Tatur (2014).

Due to commitment, we focus on policies in which the agent truthfully reports his type at every round and the principal commits to a (possibly random) supply decision as a function of this last report as well as of the entire history of reports without loss of generality.

Formally, a direct mechanism or *policy* is a collection $(\mathbf{x}_n)_{n=0}^{\infty}$, with $\mathbf{x}_n : \{l, h\}^{n+1} \rightarrow [0, 1]$ mapping a sequence of reports by the agent into a decision to supply the good during a given round.¹⁴ Our definition exploits the fact that, because preferences are time-separable, the policy may be considered independent of past realized supply decisions. A direct mechanism defines a decision problem for the agent who seeks to maximize his utility. A reporting strategy is a collection $(\mathbf{m}_n)_{n=0}^{\infty}$, where $\mathbf{m}_n : \{l, h\}^n \times \{l, h\} \rightarrow \Delta(\{l, h\})$ maps previous reports and the value during round n into a report for that round.¹⁵ The policy is *incentive compatible* if truth-telling (that is, reporting the current value faithfully, independent of past reports) is an optimal reporting strategy.

Our first objective is to solve for the *optimal* (incentive-compatible) policy, that is, for the policy that maximizes the principal's payoff subject to incentive compatibility. The *value* is the resulting payoff. Second, we would like to find a simple indirect implementation of this policy. Finally, we wish to understand the payoff and utility dynamics under this policy.

3 The i.i.d. Benchmark

We begin our investigation with the simplest case in which values are i.i.d. over time; that is, $\kappa = 0$. This is a simple variation of Thomas and Worrall (1990), although the indivisibility caused by the absence of transfers leads to dynamics that differ markedly from theirs. See Section 4 for the analysis in the general case $\kappa \geq 0$.

¹⁴For simplicity, we use the same symbols l, h for the possible agent reports as for the values of the good.

¹⁵Without loss of generality, we assume that this strategy does not depend on past values, given past reports, as the decision problem from round n onward does not depend on these past values.

With independent values, it is well known that attention can be further restricted to policies that can be represented by a tuple of functions $U_l, U_h : [0, \mu] \rightarrow [0, \mu]$, $p_l, p_h : [0, \mu] \rightarrow [0, 1]$ mapping a utility U (interpreted as the continuation utility of the agent) onto a continuation utility $u_l = U_l(U)$, $u_h = U_h(U)$ beginning during the next round as well as the probabilities $p_h(U), p_l(U)$ of supplying the good during this round given the current report of the agent. These functions must be consistent in the sense that, given U , the probabilities of supplying the good and promised continuation utilities yield U as a given utility to the agent. This is “promise keeping.” We stress that U is the *ex ante* utility in a given round; that is, it is computed before the agent’s value is realized. The reader is referred to Spear and Srivastava (1987) and Thomas and Worrall (1990) for details.¹⁶

Because such a policy is Markovian with respect to the utility U , the principal’s payoff is also a function of U only. Hence, solving for the optimal policy and the (principal’s) value function $W : [0, \mu] \rightarrow \mathbf{R}$ amounts to a Markov decision problem. Given discounting, the optimality equation characterizes both the value and the (set of) optimal policies. For any fixed $U \in [0, \mu]$, the optimality equation states the following:

$$W(U) = \sup_{p_h, p_l, u_h, u_l} \{ (1 - \delta) (qp_h(h - c) + (1 - q)p_l(l - c)) + \delta (qW(u_h) + (1 - q)W(u_l)) \} \quad (\text{OBJ})$$

subject to incentive compatibility and promise keeping, namely,

$$(1 - \delta)p_h h + \delta u_h \geq (1 - \delta)p_l h + \delta u_l, \quad (\text{IC}_H)$$

$$(1 - \delta)p_l l + \delta u_l \geq (1 - \delta)p_h l + \delta u_h, \quad (\text{IC}_L)$$

$$U = (1 - \delta) (qp_h h + (1 - q)p_l l) + \delta (qu_h + (1 - q)u_l), \quad (\text{PK})$$

$$(p_h, p_l, u_h, u_l) \in [0, 1] \times [0, 1] \times [0, \mu] \times [0, \mu].$$

The incentive compatibility and promise keeping conditions are denoted IC (IC_H , IC_L) and PK . This optimization program is denoted \mathcal{P} .

Our first objective is to calculate the value function W as well as the optimal policy. Obviously, the entire map might not be relevant once we account for the specific choice of the initial promise –some promised utilities might simply never arise for any sequence of reports. Hence, we are also interested in solving for the *initial promise* U^* , the maximizer of the value function W .

¹⁶Not every policy can be represented in this fashion, as the principal does not need to treat two histories leading to the same continuation utility identically. However, because they are equivalent from the agent’s viewpoint, the principal’s payoff must be maximized by some policy that does so.

3.1 Complete Information

Consider the benchmark case of complete information: that is, we solve \mathcal{P} dropping the IC constraints. As the values are i.i.d., we can assume, without loss of generality, that p_l, p_h are constant over time. Given U , the principal chooses p_h and p_l to maximize

$$qp_h(h - c) + (1 - q)p_l(l - c),$$

subject to $U = qp_h h + (1 - q)p_l l$. It follows easily that

Lemma 1 *Under complete information, the optimal policy is*

$$\begin{cases} p_h = \frac{U}{qh}, & p_l = 0 & \text{if } U \in [0, qh], \\ p_h = 1, & p_l = \frac{U - qh}{(1 - q)l} & \text{if } U \in [qh, \mu]. \end{cases}$$

The value function, denoted \bar{W} , is equal to

$$\bar{W}(U) = \begin{cases} (1 - \frac{c}{h}) U & \text{if } U \in [0, qh], \\ (1 - \frac{c}{l}) U + cq (\frac{h}{l} - 1) & \text{if } U \in [qh, \mu]. \end{cases}$$

Hence, the initial promise (maximizing \bar{W}) is $U_0 := qh$.

That is, unless $U = qh$, the optimal policy (p_l, p_h) cannot be efficient. To deliver $U < qh$, the principal chooses to scale down the probability with which to supply the good when the value is high, maintaining $p_l = 0$. Similarly, for $U > qh$, the principal is forced to supply the good with positive probability even when the value is low to satisfy promise keeping.

While this policy is the only constant optimal one, there are many other (non-constant) optimal policies. We will encounter some in the sequel. We call \bar{W} the complete-information payoff function. It is piecewise linear (see Figure 1). Plainly, it is an upper bound to the value function under incomplete information.

3.2 The Optimal Mechanism

We now solve for the optimal policy under incomplete information in the i.i.d. case. We first provide an informal derivation of the solution. It follows from two observations (formally established below). First,

The efficient supply choice $(p_l, p_h) = (0, 1)$ is made “as long as possible.”

To understand this qualification, note that if $U = 0$ (or $U = \mu$), promise keeping allows no latitude in the choice of probabilities. The good cannot (or must) be supplied, independent of the report. More generally, if $U \in [0, (1 - \delta)qh)$, it is impossible to supply the good if the value is high while satisfying promise keeping. In this utility range, the observation must be interpreted as indicating that the supply choice is as efficient as possible given the restriction imposed by promise keeping. This implies that a high report leads to a continuation utility of 0, with the probability of the good being supplied adjusted accordingly. An analogous interpretation applies to $U \in (\mu - (1 - \delta)(1 - q)l, \mu]$.

These two peripheral intervals vanish as $\delta \rightarrow 1$ and are ignored for the remainder of this discussion. For every other promised utility, we claim that it is optimal to make the (“static”) efficient supply choice. Intuitively, there is never a better time to redeem promised utility than when the value is high. During such rounds, the interests of the principal and agent are aligned. Conversely, there cannot be a worse opportunity to repay the agent what he is due than when the value is low because tomorrow’s value cannot be lower than today’s.

As trivial as this observation may sound, it already implies that the dynamics of the inefficiencies must be very different from those in Battaglini’s model with transfers. Here, inefficiencies are backloaded.

As the supply decision is efficient as long as possible, the high type agent has no incentive to pretend to be a low type. However,

Incentive compatibility of the low type agent always binds.

Specifically, without loss of generality, assume that IC_L always binds and disregard IC_H . The reason that IC_L binds is standard: the agent is risk neutral, and the principal’s payoff is a concave function of U (otherwise, he could offer the agent a lottery that the agent would accept and that would make the principal better off). Concavity implies that there is no gain in spreading continuation utilities u_l, u_h beyond what IC_L requires.

Because we are left with two variables (u_l, u_h) and two constraints (IC_L and PK), we can immediately solve for the optimal policy. Algebra is not needed. Because the agent is always willing to state that his value is high, it must be the case that his utility can be computed *as if* he followed this reporting strategy, namely,

$$U = (1 - \delta)\mu + \delta u_h, \text{ or } u_h = \frac{U - (1 - \delta)\mu}{\delta}.$$

Because U is a weighted average of u_h and $\mu \geq U$, it follows that $u_h \leq U$. The promised utility necessarily decreases after a high report. To compute u_l , note that the reason that the high type agent is unwilling to pretend he has a low value is that he receives an incremental

value $(1-\delta)(h-l)$ from obtaining the good relative to what would make him merely indifferent between the two reports. Hence, defining $\underline{U} := q(h-l)$, it holds that

$$U = (1-\delta)\underline{U} + \delta u_l, \text{ or } u_l = \frac{U - (1-\delta)\underline{U}}{\delta}.$$

Because U is a weighted average of \underline{U} and u_l , it follows that $u_l \leq U$ if and only if $U \leq \underline{U}$. In that case, even a low report leads to a decrease in the continuation utility, albeit a smaller decrease than if the report had been high and the good provided.

The following theorem (proved in Appendix A; see appendices for all proofs) summarizes this discussion with the necessary adjustments on the peripheral intervals.

Theorem 1 *The unique optimal policy is*

$$p_l = \max \left\{ 0, 1 - \frac{\mu - U}{(1-\delta)l} \right\}, \quad p_h = \min \left\{ 1, \frac{U}{(1-\delta)\mu} \right\}.$$

Given these values of (p_h, p_l) , continuation utilities are

$$u_h = \frac{U - (1-\delta)p_h\mu}{\delta}, \quad u_l = \frac{U - (1-\delta)(p_l l + (p_h - p_l)\underline{U})}{\delta}.$$

For reasons that will become clear shortly, this policy is not uniquely optimal for $U \leq \underline{U}$. We now turn to a discussion of the utility dynamics and of the shape of the value function, which are closely related. This discussion revolves around the following lemma.

Lemma 2 *The value function $W : [0, \mu] \rightarrow \mathbf{R}$ is continuous and concave on $[0, \mu]$, continuously differentiable on $(0, \mu)$, linear (and equal to \bar{W}) on $[0, \underline{U}]$, and strictly concave on $[\underline{U}, \mu]$. Furthermore,*

$$\lim_{U \downarrow 0} W'(U) = 1 - \frac{c}{h}, \quad \lim_{U \uparrow \mu} W'(U) = 1 - \frac{c}{l}.$$

Indeed, consider the following functional equation for W that we obtain from Theorem 1 (ignoring again the peripheral intervals for the sake of the discussion):

$$W(U) = (1-\delta)q(h-c) + \delta q W \left(\frac{U - (1-\delta)\mu}{\delta} \right) + \delta(1-q) W \left(\frac{U - (1-\delta)\underline{U}}{\delta} \right).$$

Hence, taking for granted the differentiability of W stated in the lemma,

$$W'(U) = qW'(U_h) + (1-q)W'(U_l).$$

In probabilistic terms, $W'(U_n) = \mathbf{E}[W'(U_{n+1})]$ given the information at round n . That is, W' is a bounded martingale and so converges.¹⁷ This martingale was first uncovered by Thomas and Worrall (1990); we refer to it as the TW-martingale. Because W is strictly concave on (\underline{U}, μ) , yet $u_h \neq u_l$ in this range, it follows that the process $\{U_n\}_{n=0}^\infty$ must eventually exit this interval. Hence, U_n converges to either $U_\infty = 0$ or μ . However, note that, because $u_h < U$ and $u_l \leq U$ on the interval $(0, \underline{U}]$, this interval is a transient region for the process. Hence, if we began this process in the interval $[0, \underline{U}]$, the limit must be 0 and the TW-martingale implies that W' must be constant on this interval – hence the linearity of W .¹⁸

While $W'_n := W'(U_n)$ is a martingale, U_n is not. Because the optimal policy yields

$$U_n = (1 - \delta)qh + \delta\mathbf{E}[U_{n+1}],$$

utility drifts up or down (stochastically) according to whether $U = U_n$ is above or below qh . Intuitively, if $U > qh$, then the flow utility delivered is insufficient to honor the average promised utility. Hence, the expected continuation utility must be even larger than U .

This raises the question of the initial promise U^* : where does the process converge given this initial value? The answer is delivered by the TW-martingale. Indeed, U^* is characterized by $W'(U^*) = 0$ (uniquely, given strict concavity on $[\underline{U}, \mu]$). Hence,

$$0 = W'(U^*) = \mathbf{P}[U_\infty = 0 \mid U_0 = U^*]W'(0) + \mathbf{P}[U_\infty = \mu \mid U_0 = U^*]W'(\mu),$$

where $W'(0)$ and $W'(\mu)$ are the one-sided derivatives given in the lemma. Hence,

$$\frac{\mathbf{P}[U_\infty = 0 \mid U_0 = U^*]}{\mathbf{P}[U_\infty = \mu \mid U_0 = U^*]} = \frac{(c - l)/l}{(h - c)/h}. \quad (1)$$

The initial promise is set to yield this ratio of absorption probabilities. Remarkably, this ratio is independent of the discount factor (despite the discrete nature of the random walk, the step size of which depends on δ). Both long-run outcomes are possible irrespective of patience. Depending on the parameters, U^* can be above or below qh , the first-best initial promise, as is easy to check in examples. In Appendix A, we show that U^* is decreasing in the cost, which should be clear, because the random walk $\{U_n\}$ only depends on c via the choice of initial promise U^* given by (1). We record this discussion in the next lemma.

Lemma 3 *The process $\{U_n\}_{n=0}^\infty$ (with $U_0 = U^*$) converges to 0 or μ , a.s., with probabilities given by (1).*

¹⁷It is bounded because W is concave, and hence, its derivative is bounded by its value at 0 and μ , given in the lemma.

¹⁸This yields multiple optimal policies on this range. As long as the spread is sufficiently large to satisfy IC_L , not so large as to violate IC_H , consistent with PK and contained in $[0, \underline{U}]$, it is an optimal choice.




Figure 1: Value function for $(\delta, l, h, q, c) = (.95, .40, .60, .60, .50)$.

3.3 Implementation

As mentioned above, the optimal policy is not a token mechanism because the number of units the agent receives is not fixed.¹⁹ However, the policy admits a simple indirect implementation in terms of a budget that can be described as follows. Let $f := (1 - \delta)\underline{U}$, and $g := (1 - \delta)\mu - f = (1 - \delta)l$.

Provide the agent with an initial budget of U^* . At the beginning of each round, charge him a fixed fee f . If the agent asks for the item, supply it and charge a variable fee g for it. Increase his budget by the interest rate $\frac{1}{\delta} - 1$ each round – provided that this is feasible.

This scheme might become infeasible for two reasons. First, his budget might no longer allow him to pay g for a requested unit. Then, award him whatever fraction his budget can purchase (at unit price g). Second, his budget might be so close to μ that it is no longer possible to pay him the interest rate on his budget. Then, return the excess to him, independent of his report, at a conversion rate that is also given by the price g .

For budgets below \underline{U} , the agent is “in the red,” and even if he does not buy a unit, his budget shrinks over time. If his budget is above \underline{U} , he is “in the black,” and forgoing a unit increases the budget. When doing so pushes the budget above $\mu - (1 - \delta)(1 - q)l$, the agent

¹⁹To be clear, this is not an artifact of discounting: the optimal policy in the finite-horizon undiscounted version of our model can be derived along the same lines (using the binding IC_L and PK constraints), and the number of units obtained by the agent is also history-dependent in that case.

“breaks the bank” and reaches μ in case of another forgoing, which is an absorbing state.

This structure is reminiscent of results in research on optimal financial contracting (see, for instance, Biais, Mariotti, Plantin and Rochet, 2007), a literature that assumes transfers.²⁰ In this literature, one obtains (for some parameters) an upper absorbing boundary (at which the agent receives the first-best outcome) and a lower absorbing boundary (at which the project is terminated). There are important differences, however. The agent is not paid in the intermediate region: promises are the only source of incentives. In our environment, the agent receives the good if his value is high, achieving efficiency in this intermediate region.

As we explain in Section 4, this simple implementation relies on the independence of types over time. With persistence, the (real) return on the budget –which admits a simple interpretation in terms of an inside option– will depend on its size.

3.4 A Comparison with Token Mechanisms as in Jackson and Sonnenschein (2007)

We postpone the discussion of the role of transfers to Section 4.5 because the environment considered in Section 4 is the counterpart to Battaglini (2005). However, because token mechanisms are typically introduced in i.i.d. environments, we make some observations concerning the connection between our results and those of Jackson and Sonnenschein (2007) to explain how our dynamic analysis differs from the static one with many copies.

The distinction between static and dynamic problem isn’t about discounting, but about the agent’s information. In Jackson and Sonnenschein (2007), the agent is a prophet, in the sense of stochastic processes: he knows the entire realization of the process from the beginning; in our environment, the agent is a forecaster: the process of his reports must be predictable with respect to the realized values up to the current date.

For the purpose of asymptotic analysis (when either the discount factor tends to 1 or the number of equally weighted copies $T < \infty$ tends to infinity), the distinction is irrelevant: token mechanisms are optimal (but not uniquely so) in the limit, whether the problem is static or dynamic. Because the emphasis in Jackson and Sonnenschein is on asymptotic analysis, they focus on a static model and on token mechanisms; they derive a rate of convergence for this mechanism (namely, the loss relative to the first-best outcome is of the order $\mathcal{O}(1/\sqrt{T})$), and discuss the extension of their results to the dynamic case.

²⁰There are other important differences in the set-up. They allow two instruments: downsizing the firm and payments. Additionally, this is a moral hazard-type problem because the agent can divert resources from a risky project, reducing the likelihood that it succeeds during a given period.

In fact, if attention is restricted to token mechanisms, and values are binary, the outcome is the same in the static and dynamic version. Forgoing low-value items as long as the budget does not allow all remaining units to be claimed is not costly, as subsequent units cannot be worth even less. Similarly, accepting high-value items cannot be a mistake.

However, for a fixed discount factor (or a fixed number of units), and even with binary values, token mechanisms are not optimal, whether the problem is static or dynamic; and the optimal mechanisms aren't the same for both problems. In the dynamic case, as we have seen, a report not only affects whether the agent obtains the current unit but also affects the total number he obtains.²¹ In the static case, the optimal mechanism does not simply ask the agent to select a fixed number of copies that he would like but offers him a menu that trades off the risk in obtaining the units he claims are low or high and the expected number that he receives.²² The agent's private information pertains not only to whether a given unit has a high value but also to how many units are high. Token mechanisms do not elicit any information in this regard. Because the prophet has more information than the forecaster, the optimal mechanisms are distinct.

The question of how the two *optimal* mechanisms compare (in terms of average efficiency) isn't entirely obvious. Because the prophet has better information about the number of high-value items, the mechanism must satisfy more incentive-compatibility constraints (which harms welfare) but might induce a better fit between the number of units he receives and the number he should receive. Indeed, there are examples (say, for $T = 2$) in which the comparison goes either way depending on parameters.²³ Asymptotically, the comparison is clear, as the next lemma states. The proof is relegated to Online Appendix C.1.

Lemma 4 *It holds that*

$$|W(U^*) - q(h - c)| = \mathcal{O}(1 - \delta).$$

In the case of a prophetic agent, the average loss converges to zero at rate $\mathcal{O}(\sqrt{1 - \delta})$.

²¹To be clear, token mechanisms are not optimal even without discounting.

²²The exact characterization of the optimal mechanism in the case of a prophetic agent is somewhat peripheral to our analysis and is thus omitted.

²³Consider a two-round example with no discounting in which $q = 1/2, h = 4, l = 1, c = 2$. If the agent is a prophet, he is offered the choice between one unit for sure, or two units, each with probability $4/5$. The hl, lh agent chooses the former, and the hh, ll agent the latter. When the agent is a forecaster, let p_1, p_2 denote the probabilities of supply in rounds 1, 2. The high type in the first round chooses $(p_1, p_2) = (1, 3/5)$, and the low type chooses $(p_1, p_2) = (0, 1)$. It is easy to verify that the principal is better off when facing a prophetic agent. Suppose instead $q = 2/3, h = 10, l = 1, c = 9$. A prophetic agent is offered a pooling menu in which he receives one unit for sure. When the agent is a forecaster, the high-type contract is $(p_1, p_2) = (1, 0)$, and the low-type contract is $(p_1, p_2) = (0, 1/7)$. It is easy to verify that the principal is better off with a forecaster.

For a prophet, the rate is no better than with token mechanisms. Token mechanisms achieve rate $\mathcal{O}(\sqrt{1-\delta})$ precisely because they do not attempt to elicit the number of high units. By the central limit theorem, this implies that a token mechanism “gets it wrong” by an order of $\mathcal{O}(\sqrt{1-\delta})$. With a prophet, incentive compatibility is so stringent that the optimal mechanism performs hardly better, eliminating only a fraction of this inefficiency.²⁴ The forecaster’s relative lack of information serves the principal. Because the former knows values only one round in advance, he gives the information away for free until absorption. His private information regarding the number of high units being of the order $(1-\delta)$, the overall inefficiency is of the same order. Both rates are tight (see the proof of Lemma 4): indeed, were the agent to hold private information for the initial round only, there would already be an inefficiency of the order $1-\delta$; hence, welfare cannot converge faster.

To sum up: token mechanisms are never optimal, but they do well in the prophetic case. Not so with a forecaster.

4 Persistent Types

We now return to the general model in which types are persistent rather than independent. As a warm-up, consider the case of perfect persistence $\rho_h = \rho_l = 0$. In that case, future allocations just cannot be used as instruments to elicit truth-telling. We revert to the static problem for which the solution is to either always provide the good (if $\mu \geq c$) or never do so.

This makes the role of persistence not entirely obvious. Because current types assign different probabilities of being a high type tomorrow, one might hope that tying promised future utility to current reports facilitates truth-telling. But the case of perfectly persistent types also shows that correlation diminishes the scope for using future allocations as “transfers.” A definite answer is obtained in the continuous time limit in Section 5.1.

The techniques that served us well with independent values are no longer useful. We will not be able to rely on martingale techniques. Worse, *ex ante* utility is no longer a valid state variable. To understand why, note that with independent types, an agent of a given type can evaluate his utility based only on his current type, on the probability of allocation as a function of his report, and the promised continuation utility tomorrow as a function of his report. However, if today’s type is correlated with tomorrow’s type, the agent cannot evaluate his continuation utility without knowing how the principal intends to implement it.

²⁴This result might be surprising given Cohn’s (2010) “improvement” upon Jackson and Sonnenschein. However, while Jackson and Sonnenschein cover our set-up, Cohn does not and features more instruments at the principal’s disposal. See also Eilat and Pauzner (2011) for an optimal mechanism in a related setting.

This is problematic because the agent can deviate, unbeknown to the principal, in which case the continuation utility computed by the principal, given his incorrect belief regarding the agent's type tomorrow, is not the same as the continuation utility under the agent's belief.

However, conditional on the agent's type tomorrow, his type today carries no information on future types by the Markovian assumption. Hence, tomorrow's promised *interim* utilities suffice for the agent to compute his utility today regardless of whether he deviates. Of course, his type tomorrow is not directly observable. Instead, we must use the utility he receives from tomorrow's report (assuming he tells the truth). That is, we must specify his promised utility tomorrow conditional on each possible report at that time.

This creates no difficulty in terms of his truth-telling incentives tomorrow: because the agent does truthfully report his type on path, he also does so after having lied at the previous round (conditional on his current type and his previous report, his previous type does not enter his decision problem). The one-shot deviation principle holds: when the agent considers lying now, there is no loss in assuming that he reports truthfully tomorrow.

Plainly, we are not the first to note that, with persistence, the appropriate state variables are the *interim* utilities. See Townsend (1982), Fernandes and Phelan (2000), Cole and Kocherlakota (2001), Doepke and Townsend (2006) and Zhang and Zenios (2008). Yet here, this is still not enough to evaluate the principal's payoff and use dynamic programming. We must also specify the principal's belief. Let ϕ denote the probability that she assigns to the high type. This probability can take only three values depending on whether this is the initial round or whether the last report was high or low. Nonetheless, it is just as convenient to treat ϕ as an arbitrary element in the unit interval.

4.1 The Program

As discussed above, the principal's optimization program, cast as a dynamic programming problem, requires three state variables: the belief of the principal, $\phi = \mathbf{P}[v = h] \in [0, 1]$, and the pair of (*interim*) utilities that the principal delivers as a function of the current report, U_h, U_l . The largest utility μ_h (resp., μ_l) that can be given to a player whose type is high (resp. low) is delivered by always supplying the good. The utility pair (μ_h, μ_l) solves

$$\mu_h = (1 - \delta)h + \delta(1 - \rho_h)\mu_h + \delta\rho_h\mu_l, \quad \mu_l = (1 - \delta)l + \delta(1 - \rho_l)\mu_l + \delta\rho_l\mu_h;$$

that is,

$$\mu_h = h - \frac{\delta\rho_h(h - l)}{1 - \delta + \delta(\rho_h + \rho_l)}, \quad \mu_l = l + \frac{\delta\rho_l(h - l)}{1 - \delta + \delta(\rho_h + \rho_l)}.$$

We note that

$$\mu_h - \mu_l = \frac{1 - \delta}{1 - \delta + \delta(\rho_h + \rho_l)}(h - l).$$

The gap between these largest utilities decreases in δ , and vanishes as $\delta \rightarrow 1$.

A policy is now a pair $p_h : \mathbf{R}^2 \rightarrow [0, 1]$ and $p_l : \mathbf{R}^2 \rightarrow [0, 1]$ mapping the current utility vector $U = (U_h, U_l)$ onto the probability with which the good is supplied as a function of the report, and a pair $U(h) : \mathbf{R}^2 \rightarrow \mathbf{R}^2$ and $U(l) : \mathbf{R}^2 \rightarrow \mathbf{R}^2$ mapping U onto the promised utilities $(U_h(h), U_l(h))$ if the report is h , and $(U_h(l), U_l(l))$ if it is l . We abuse notation, as the domain of $(U(h), U(l))$ should be those vectors that are feasible and incentive compatible.

Define the function $W : [0, \mu_h] \times [0, \mu_l] \times [0, 1] \rightarrow \mathbf{R} \cup \{-\infty\}$ that solves the following program for all $U \in [0, \mu_h] \times [0, \mu_l]$, and $\phi \in [0, 1]$:

$$\begin{aligned} W(U, \phi) &= \sup \{ \phi ((1 - \delta)p_h(h - c) + \delta W(U(h), 1 - \rho_h)) \\ &+ (1 - \phi) ((1 - \delta)p_l(l - c) + \delta W(U(l), \rho_l)) \}, \end{aligned}$$

over $p_h, p_l \in [0, 1]$, and $U(h), U(l) \in [0, \mu_h] \times [0, \mu_l]$ subject to promise keeping and incentive compatibility, namely,

$$U_h = (1 - \delta)p_h h + \delta(1 - \rho_h)U_h(h) + \delta\rho_h U_l(h) \tag{2}$$

$$\geq (1 - \delta)p_l h + \delta(1 - \rho_h)U_h(l) + \delta\rho_h U_l(l), \tag{3}$$

and

$$U_l = (1 - \delta)p_l l + \delta(1 - \rho_l)U_l(l) + \delta\rho_l U_h(l) \tag{4}$$

$$\geq (1 - \delta)p_h l + \delta(1 - \rho_l)U_l(h) + \delta\rho_l U_h(h), \tag{5}$$

with the convention that $\sup W = -\infty$ whenever the feasible set is empty. Note that W is concave on its domain (by the linearity of the constraints in the utilities). An *optimal* policy is a map from (U, ϕ) into $(p_h, p_l, U(h), U(l))$ that achieves the supremum given W .

4.2 Complete Information

Proceeding as with i.i.d. types, we briefly review the solution under complete information, that is, dropping (3) and (5). Write \bar{W} for the resulting value function. If we ignore promises, the efficient policy is to supply the good if and only if the type is h . Let v_h^* (or v_l^*) denote the utility that a high (or low) type obtains under this policy. The pair (v_h^*, v_l^*) satisfies

$$v_h^* = (1 - \delta)h + \delta(1 - \rho_h)v_h^* + \delta\rho_h v_l^*, \quad v_l^* = \delta(1 - \rho_l)v_l^* + \delta\rho_l v_h^*,$$

which yields

$$v_h^* = \frac{h(1 - \delta(1 - \rho_l))}{1 - \delta(1 - \rho_h - \rho_l)}, \quad v_l^* = \frac{\delta h \rho_l}{1 - \delta(1 - \rho_h - \rho_l)}.$$

When a high type's utility U_h is in $[0, v_h^*]$, the principal supplies the good only if the type is high. Thus, the payoff is $U_h(1 - c/h)$. When $U_h \in (v_h^*, \mu_h]$, the principal always supplies the good if the type is high. To fulfill her promise, the principal also supplies the good when the type is low. The payoff is $v_h^*(1 - c/h) + (U_h - v_h^*)(1 - c/l)$. We proceed analogously given U_l (the problems of delivering U_h and U_l are uncoupled). In summary, $\bar{W}(U, \phi)$ is given by

$$\begin{cases} \phi \frac{U_h(h-c)}{h} + (1 - \phi) \frac{U_l(h-c)}{h} & \text{if } U \in [0, v_h^*] \times [0, v_l^*], \\ \phi \frac{U_h(h-c)}{h} + (1 - \phi) \left(\frac{v_l^*(h-c)}{h} + \frac{(U_l - v_l^*)(l-c)}{l} \right) & \text{if } U \in [0, v_h^*] \times [v_l^*, \mu_l], \\ \phi \left(\frac{v_h^*(h-c)}{h} + \frac{(U_h - v_h^*)(l-c)}{l} \right) + (1 - \phi) \frac{U_l(h-c)}{h} & \text{if } U \in [v_h^*, \mu_h] \times [0, v_l^*], \\ \phi \left(\frac{v_h^*(h-c)}{h} + \frac{(U_h - v_h^*)(l-c)}{l} \right) + (1 - \phi) \left(\frac{v_l^*(h-c)}{h} + \frac{(U_l - v_l^*)(l-c)}{l} \right) & \text{if } U \in [v_h^*, \mu_h] \times [v_l^*, \mu_l]. \end{cases}$$

For future purposes, note that the derivative of W (differentiable except at $U_h = v_h^*$ and $U_l = v_l^*$) is in the interval $[1 - c/l, 1 - c/h]$, as expected. The latter corresponds to the most efficient utility allocation, whereas the former corresponds to the most inefficient allocation. In fact, W is piecewise linear (a ‘‘tilted pyramid’’) with a global maximum at $v^* = (v_h^*, v_l^*)$.

4.3 Feasible and Incentive-Feasible Utility Pairs

One difficulty in using *interim* utilities as state variables is that the dimensionality of the problem increases with the cardinality of the type set. A related difficulty is that it is not obvious which vectors of utilities are feasible given the incentive constraints. For instance, promising to assign all future units to the agent in the event that his current report is high while assigning none if this report is low is simply not incentive compatible.

The set of *feasible* utility pairs (that is, the largest bounded set of vectors U such that (2) and (4) can be satisfied with continuation vectors in the set itself) is easy to describe. Because the two promise keeping equations are uncoupled, it is simply the set $[0, \mu_h] \times [0, \mu_l]$ (as was already implicit in Section 4.2). What is challenging is to solve for the feasible, incentive-compatible (in short, incentive-feasible) utility pairs: these are *interim* utilities for which there are probabilities and promised utility pairs tomorrow that make truth-telling optimal and such that these promised utility pairs tomorrow satisfy the same property.

Definition 1 *The incentive-feasible set, $V \in \mathbf{R}^2$, is the set of interim utilities in round 0 that are obtained for some incentive-compatible policy.*

It is standard to show that V is the largest bounded set such that for each $U \in V$ there exists $p_h, p_l \in [0, 1]$ and two pairs $U(h), U(l) \in V$ solving (2)–(5).²⁵

Our first step is to solve for V . To obtain some intuition regarding its structure, let us enumerate some of its elements. Clearly, $0 \in V$ and $\mu := (\mu_h, \mu_l) \in V$. It suffices to never or always supply the unit, independent of the reports.²⁶ More generally, for any integer $\nu \geq 0$, the principal can supply the unit for the first ν rounds, independent of the reports, and never supply the unit after. We refer to such policies as pure *frontloaded* policies because they deliver a given number of units as quickly as possible. Similarly, a pure *backloaded* policy does not supply the unit for the first ν rounds but does so afterward, independent of the reports. A (possibly mixed) frontloaded (resp., backloaded) policy is one that randomizes over two pure frontloaded (resp., backloaded) policies over two consecutive integers.

Fix a backloaded and a frontloaded policy such that the high-value agent is indifferent between the two. Then, the low-value agent prefers the backloaded policy, because the conditional expectation of his value for a unit in a given round ν increases with ν .

The utility pairs corresponding to such policies are immediate to define in parametric form. Given $\nu \in \mathbf{N}$, let

$$\underline{u}_h^\nu = \mathbf{E} \left[(1 - \delta) \sum_{n=0}^{\nu-1} \delta^n v_n \mid v_0 = h \right], \quad \underline{u}_l^\nu = \mathbf{E} \left[(1 - \delta) \sum_{n=0}^{\nu-1} \delta^n v_n \mid v_0 = l \right], \quad (6)$$

and set $\underline{u}^\nu := (\underline{u}_h^\nu, \underline{u}_l^\nu)$. This is the utility pair when the principal supplies the unit for the first ν rounds, independent of the reports. Second, for $\nu \in \mathbf{N}$, let

$$\bar{u}_h^\nu = \mathbf{E} \left[(1 - \delta) \sum_{n=\nu}^{\infty} \delta^n v_n \mid v_0 = h \right], \quad \bar{u}_l^\nu = \mathbf{E} \left[(1 - \delta) \sum_{n=\nu}^{\infty} \delta^n v_n \mid v_0 = l \right], \quad (7)$$

and set $\bar{u}^\nu := (\bar{u}_h^\nu, \bar{u}_l^\nu)$.²⁷ This is the pair when the principal supplies the unit only from round ν onward. The sequence \bar{u}^ν is decreasing (in both arguments) as ν increases, with $\bar{u}^0 = \mu$ and $\lim_{\nu \rightarrow \infty} \bar{u}^\nu = 0$. Similarly, \underline{u}^ν is increasing, with $\underline{u}^0 = 0$ and $\lim_{\nu \rightarrow \infty} \underline{u}^\nu = \mu$.

Not only is backloading better than frontloading for the low-value agent for a fixed high-value agent's utility, but these policies also yield the best and worst utilities. Formally,

²⁵Incentive-feasibility is closely related to self-generation (see Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti, 1990), though it pertains to the different types of a single agent rather than to different players. The distinction is not merely a matter of interpretation because a high type can become a low type and vice-versa, which represents a situation with no analogue in repeated games. Nonetheless, the proof of this characterization is identical.

²⁶Again, with some abuse, we write $\mu \in \mathbf{R}^2$.

²⁷Here and in Section 4.6, we omit the obvious corresponding analytic expressions. See Appendix B.

Lemma 5 *It holds that*

$$V = \text{co}\{\bar{u}^\nu, \underline{u}^\nu : \nu \in \mathbf{N}\}.$$

That is, V is a polygon with a countable infinity of vertices (and two accumulation points). See Figure 2 for an illustration. It is easily verified that




Figure 2: The set V for parameters $(\delta, \rho_h, \rho_l, l, h) = (9/10, 1/3, 1/4, 1/4, 1)$.

$$\lim_{\nu \rightarrow \infty} \frac{\bar{u}_l^{\nu+1} - \bar{u}_l^\nu}{\bar{u}_h^{\nu+1} - \bar{u}_h^\nu} = \lim_{\nu \rightarrow \infty} \frac{\underline{u}_l^{\nu+1} - \underline{u}_l^\nu}{\underline{u}_h^{\nu+1} - \underline{u}_h^\nu} = 1.$$

When the switching time ν is large, the change in the agent's utility from increasing this time is largely unaffected by his initial type. Hence, the slopes of the boundaries are less than and approach 1 as $\nu \rightarrow \infty$. Because $(\mu_l - v_l^*)/(\mu_h - v_h^*) > 1$, the vector v^* is outside V . This isn't surprising. Due to private information, the low-type agent derives information rents: if the high-type agent's utility were first-best, the low-type agent's utility would be too high.

Persistence affects the set V as follows. When $\kappa = 0$ and values are i.i.d., the low-value agent values the unit in round $\nu \geq 1$ the same as the high-value agent does. Round 0 is the exception. As a result, the vertices $\{\bar{u}^\nu\}_{\nu=1}^\infty$ (or $\{\underline{u}^\nu\}_{\nu=1}^\infty$) are aligned and V is a parallelogram

with vertices $0, \mu, \bar{u}^1$ and \underline{u}^1 . As κ increases, the imbalance between type utilities increases. The set V flattens. With perfect persistence, the low-type agent no longer cares about frontloading versus backloading, as no amount of time allows his type to change. See Figure 3.




Figure 3: Impact of persistence, as measured by $\kappa \geq 0$.

The structure of V relies on $\kappa \geq 0$. If types were negatively correlated over time, then frontloading and backloading would not span the boundary of V . Indeed, consider the case in which there is perfect negative serial correlation. Then, providing the unit if and only if the round is odd (even) favors (hurts) the low-type agent relative to the high-type agent. These two policies achieve the extreme points of V . According to whether higher or lower values of U_h are considered, the other boundary points combine such alternation with frontloading or backloading. A negative correlation thus requires a separate treatment, omitted here.

Front- and backloading are not the only policies achieving boundary utilities. The lower locus corresponds to policies that assign maximum probability to the good being supplied for high reports, while promising continuation utilities on the lower locus that make IC_L bind. The upper locus corresponds to policies assigning minimum probability to the good being supplied for low reports while promising continuation utilities on the upper locus that make IC_H bind. Front- and backloading are representative examples within each class.

4.4 The Optimal Mechanism and Implementation

Not every incentive-feasible utility vector arises under the optimal policy. Irrespective of the sequence of reports, some vectors are never used. While it is necessary to solve for the value function and optimal policy on the entire domain V , we first focus on the subset of V that is relevant given the optimal initial promise and resulting dynamics. We relegate the discussion of the optimal policy for other utility vectors to Section 4.6.




Figure 4: Dynamics of utility on the lower locus.

This subset is the lower locus—the polygonal chain spanned by pure frontloading. Two observations from the i.i.d. case remain valid. First, the efficient choice is made as long as possible; second, the promises are chosen so the agent is indifferent between the two reports when his type is low. To understand why such a policy yields utilities on the “frontloading” boundary (as mentioned in Section 4.3), note that, because the low type is indifferent between both reports, the agent is willing to say high irrespective of his type. Because the good is then supplied, the agent’s utilities can be computed as if frontloading prevailed.

From the principal’s perspective, however, it matters that frontloading isn’t actually implemented. As in the i.i.d. case, the payoff is higher under the optimal policy. Making the efficient supply choice as long as possible, even if it involves delay, increases this payoff.

Hence, after a high report, continuation utility declines.²⁸ Specifically, $U(h)$ is computed

²⁸Because the lower boundary is upward sloping, the *interim* utilities of both types vary in the same way.

as under frontloading as the solution to the following system, given U :

$$U_v = (1 - \delta)v + \delta \mathbf{E}_v[U(h)], \quad v = l, h.$$

Here, $\mathbf{E}_v[U(h)]$ is the expectation of the utility vector $U(h)$ provided that the current type is v (e.g., for $v = h$, $\mathbf{E}_v[U(h)] = \rho_h U_l(h) + (1 - \rho_h)U_h(h)$).

The promised $U(l)$ does not admit such an explicit formula because it is pinned down by IC_L and the requirement that it lies on the lower boundary. In fact, $U(l)$ might be lower or higher than U (see Figure 4) depending on U . If U is high enough, $U(l)$ is higher; conversely, under certain conditions, $U(l)$ is lower than U when U is low enough.²⁹ This condition has a simple geometric interpretation: if the half-open line segment $(0, v^*]$ intersects the lower boundary and let \underline{U} denote the intersection,³⁰ then $U(l)$ is lower than U if and only if U lies below \underline{U} .³¹ However, if there is no such intersection, then $U(l)$ is always higher than U . This intersection exists if and only if

$$\frac{h - l}{l} > \frac{1 - \delta}{\delta \rho_l}. \quad (8)$$

Hence, $U(l)$ is higher than U (for all U) if the low-type persistence is sufficiently high. Utility declines even after a low report if U is so low that even the low-type agent expects to have sufficiently fast and often a high value that the efficient policy would yield too high a utility. When the low-type persistence is high, this does not occur.³² As in the i.i.d. case, the principal achieves the complete-information payoff if and only if $U \leq \underline{U}$ (or $U = \mu$). We summarize this discussion with the following theorem, a special case of the next.

Theorem 2 *The optimal policy consists of the constrained-efficient policy*

$$p_l = \max \left\{ 0, 1 - \frac{\mu_l - U_l}{(1 - \delta)l} \right\}, \quad p_h = \min \left\{ 1, \frac{U_h}{(1 - \delta)h} \right\},$$

in addition to a (specific) initially promised $U_0 > \underline{U}$ on the lower boundary of V and choices $(U(h), U(l))$ on this lower boundary such that IC_L always binds.

While the implementation in the i.i.d. case is described in terms of a “utility budget,” inspired by the use of (*ex ante*) utility as a state variable, the analysis of the Markov case

Accordingly, we use terms such as “higher” or “lower” utility and write $U < U'$ for the component-wise order.

²⁹As in the i.i.d. case, $U(l)$ is always higher than $U(h)$.

³⁰This line has the equation $U_l = \frac{\delta \rho_l}{1 - \delta(1 - \rho_l)} U_h$.

³¹With some abuse, we write $\underline{U} \in \mathbf{R}^2$ because it is the natural extension of $\underline{U} \in \mathbf{R}$ as introduced in Section 3. Additionally, we set $\underline{U} = 0$ if the intersection does not exist.

³²This condition is satisfied in the i.i.d. case due to our assumption that $\delta > l/\mu$.

strongly suggests the use of a more concrete metric –the number of units that the agent is entitled to claim in a row with “no questions asked.” The vectors on the boundary are parameterized by the number of rounds required to reach 0 under frontloading. We denote such a policy by a number $x \geq 0$, with the interpretation that the good is supplied for the first $\lfloor x \rfloor$ rounds, and with probability $x - \lfloor x \rfloor$ also during round $\lfloor x \rfloor + 1$. (Here, $\lfloor x \rfloor$ denotes the integer part of x .) The corresponding utility pair is written as $(U_h(x), U_l(x))$ such that

$$U_h(x) = \mathbf{E} \left[(1 - \delta) \sum_{n=0}^{\lfloor x \rfloor - 1} \delta^n v_n \mid v_0 = h \right] + (x - \lfloor x \rfloor) \mathbf{E} [(1 - \delta) \delta^{\lfloor x \rfloor} v_{\lfloor x \rfloor} \mid v_0 = h],$$

$$U_l(x) = \mathbf{E} \left[(1 - \delta) \sum_{n=0}^{\lfloor x \rfloor - 1} \delta^n v_n \mid v_0 = l \right] + (x - \lfloor x \rfloor) \mathbf{E} [(1 - \delta) \delta^{\lfloor x \rfloor} v_{\lfloor x \rfloor} \mid v_0 = l].$$

If $x = \infty$, the good is always supplied, yielding utility μ .

We may think of the optimal policy as follows. During a given round n , the agent is promised x_n . If the agent asks for the unit (and this is feasible, that is, $x_n \geq 1$), the next promise $x_{n+1}(h)$ equals $x_n - 1$. It is easy to verify that the following holds for both $v = l, h$:

$$U_v(x_n) = (1 - \delta)v + \delta \mathbf{E} [U_{v_{n+1}}(x_n - 1) \mid v_n = v]. \quad (9)$$

If $x_n < 1$ and the agent asks for the unit, he receives the unit with probability x_n and obtains a continuation utility of 0. Instead, claiming to be low leads to the revised promise $x_{n+1}(l)$ such that

$$U_l(x_n) = \delta \mathbf{E} [U_{v_{n+1}}(x_{n+1}(l)) \mid v_n = l], \quad (10)$$

provided that there exists a (finite) $x_{n+1}(l)$ that solves this equation.³³ Combing (9) and (10), we obtain the following:

$$(1 - \delta)l = \delta \mathbf{E} [U_{v_{n+1}}(x_{n+1}(l)) - U_{v_{n+1}}(x_n - 1) \mid v_n = l].$$

Therefore, the promise after the low report $x_{n+1}(l)$ is chosen so that the low-value agent is indifferent between consuming the current unit and consuming the units between $x_n - 1$ and $x_{n+1}(l)$. With i.i.d. types, the policy described by (9)–(10) reduces to that described in Section 3.3 (a special case of the Markovian case).

It is perhaps surprising that the optimal policy can be derived but less surprising that comparative statics are difficult to obtain except by numerical simulations. By scaling both

³³This is impossible if the promised x_n is too large (formally, if the payoff vector $(U_h(x_n), U_l(x_n)) \in V_h$). In that case, the good is provided with the probability \tilde{q} that solves $\frac{U_l(x_n) - \tilde{q}(1 - \delta)l}{\delta} = \mathbf{E} [U_{v_{n+1}}(\infty) \mid v_n = l]$.

ρ_l and ρ_h by a common factor, $p \geq 0$, one varies the persistence of the value without affecting the invariant probability q , and hence, the value μ is also unaffected. Numerically, it appears that a decrease in persistence (an increase in p) leads to a higher payoff. When $p = 0$, types never change, and we are left with a static problem. When p increases, types change more rapidly, and the promised utility becomes a more effective currency.

As mentioned, these comparative statics are merely suggested by simulations. As promised utility varies as a random walk with unequal step size on a grid that is itself a polygonal chain, there is little hope of establishing this result more formally. To derive a result along these lines, see Section 5.1. Nonetheless, we note that it is not persistence but positive correlation that is detrimental. It is tempting to think that any type of persistence is bad because it endows the agent with private information that pertains not only to today's value but also to tomorrow's, and eliciting private information is often costly. But conditional on today's type, the agent's information regarding his future type is known.³⁴

Given any initial choice of U_0 , finitely many consecutive reports of l or h suffice for the promised utility to reach μ or 0. By the Borel-Cantelli lemma, this implies that absorption occurs almost surely. As in the i.i.d. case, the *ex ante* utility computed under the invariant distribution is a random process that drifts upward if and only if $qU_l + (1 - q)U_h \geq qh$, where the right-hand side is the flow utility under the efficient policy. However, we are unable to derive the absorption probabilities beginning from the optimal initial promise (we know of no analogue to the TW-martingale).³⁵

4.5 A Comparison with Transfers as in Battaglini (2005)

As mentioned, our model can be regarded as the no-transfer counterpart of Battaglini (2005). The difference in results is striking. A main finding of Battaglini, “no distortion at the top,” has no counterpart here. With transfers, efficient provision occurs *forever* once the agent first reports a high type. Further, even along the history in which efficiency is not achieved in finite time, namely, an uninterrupted string of low reports, efficiency is asymptotically approached. As explained above, we necessarily obtain (with probability one) an inefficient outcome, which can be implemented without further reports. Moreover, both long-run outcomes can arise. To sum up, with (resp., without) transfers, inefficiencies are frontloaded (resp.,

³⁴With perfectly negatively correlated types, the complete information payoff is achieved: offer the agent a choice between receiving the good in all odd or all even rounds. As $\delta > l/h$ (we assumed that $\delta > l/\mu$), truth-telling is optimal. Just as in the case of a lower discount rate, a more negative correlation (or less positive correlation) makes future promises more effective incentives because preference misalignment is shorter-lived.

³⁵Starting from the optimal initial promise, both long-run outcomes have strictly positive probability.

backloaded) to the greatest extent possible.

The difference can be understood as follows. First, and importantly, Battaglini's results rely on revenue maximization being the objective. With transfers, efficiency is trivial: simply charge c whenever the good must be supplied. When revenue is maximized, transfers reverse the incentive constraints: it is no longer the low type who would like to mimic the high type but the high type who would like to avoid paying his entire value for the good by claiming he is low. The high type incentive constraint binds and he must be given information rents. Ideally, the principal would like to charge for these rents *before* the agent has private information, when the expected value of these rents to the agent is still common knowledge. When types are i.i.d., this poses no difficulty, and these rents can be expropriated one round ahead of time. With correlation, however, different types of agents value these rents differently, as their likelihood of being high in the future depends on their current types. However, when considering information rents sufficiently far in the future, the initial type exerts a minimal effect on the conditional expectation of the value of these rents. Hence, the value can "almost" be extracted. As a result, it is in the principal's best interest to maximize the surplus and offer a nearly efficient contract at all dates that are sufficiently far away.

Money plays two roles. First, because it is an instrument that allows promises to "clear" on the spot without allocative distortions, it prevents the occurrence of backloaded inefficiencies – a poor substitute for money in this regard. Even if payments could not be made "in advance," this would suffice to restore efficiency if that were the goal. Another role of money, as highlighted by Battaglini, is that it allows value to be transferred before information becomes asymmetric. Hence, information rents no longer impede efficiency, at least with respect to the remote future. These future inefficiencies are eliminated altogether.

A plausible intermediate case arises when money is available but the agent is protected by limited liability, so that payments can only be made from the principal to the agent. The principal maximizes social surplus net of any payments.³⁶ In this case, we show in Appendix C.3 (see Lemma 11) that no transfers are made if (and only if) $c - l < l$. This condition can be interpreted as follows: $c - l$ is the cost to the principal of incurring one round inefficiency (supplying the good when the type is low), whereas l is the cost to the agent of forgoing a low-value unit. Hence, if it is costlier to buy off the agent than to supply the good when the value is low, the principal prefers to follow the optimal policy without money.

³⁶If payments do not matter for the principal, efficiency is easily achieved because he would pay c to the agent if and only if the report is low and nothing otherwise.

4.6 The General Solution

Theorem 2 follows from the analysis of the optimal policy on the entire domain, V . Because only those values in V along the lower boundary are relevant, the reader might elect to skip this subsection, which completely solves the program in Section 4.1.

We further divide V into subsets and introduce two sequences of utility vectors. First, given \underline{U} , define the sequence $\{v^\nu\}_{\nu \geq 0}$ by

$$v_h^\nu = \mathbf{E} [\delta^\nu \underline{U}_{v_\nu} \mid v_0 = h], \quad v_l^\nu = \mathbf{E} [\delta^\nu \underline{U}_{v_\nu} \mid v_0 = l]. \quad (11)$$

Intuitively, this is the payoff from waiting for ν rounds from initial value h or l , and then getting \underline{U}_{v_ν} . Let \underline{V} be the payoff vectors in V that lie below the graph of the set of points $\{v^\nu\}_{\nu \geq 0}$. Figure 5 illustrates this construction. Note that \underline{V} has a non-empty interior if and only if ρ_l is sufficiently large (see (8)). This set is the domain of utilities for which the complete information payoff can be achieved, as stated below.

Lemma 6 *For all $U \in \underline{V} \cup \{\mu\}$ and all ϕ ,*

$$W(U, \phi) = \bar{W}(U, \phi).$$

Conversely, if $U \notin \underline{V} \cup \{\mu\}$, then $W(U, \phi) < \bar{W}(U, \phi)$ for all $\phi \in (0, 1)$.

To understand Lemma 6, we first observe that if the agent is promised \underline{U} , his future promised utility after a low report is exactly \underline{U} under the optimal policy. Therefore, for any U that is on the lower locus of V and lies below \underline{U} , the complete information payoff can be achieved. Second, for any $\nu \geq 1$, the utility v^ν can be delivered by not supplying the unit in the current round and setting the future utility to be $v^{\nu-1}$, regardless of the report. The agent's promised utility becomes $\underline{U}(= v^0)$ after ν rounds. From this point on, the optimal policy as specified in Theorem 2 is implemented. Clearly, under this policy, the unit is never supplied when the agent's value is low. Therefore, the complete information payoff is achieved.

Second, we define $\hat{u}^\nu := (\hat{u}_h^\nu, \hat{u}_l^\nu)$, $\nu \geq 0$ as follows:

$$\hat{u}_h^\nu = \mathbf{E} \left[(1 - \delta) \sum_{n=1}^{\nu} \delta^n v_n \mid v_0 = h \right], \quad \hat{u}_l^\nu = \mathbf{E} \left[(1 - \delta) \sum_{n=1}^{\nu} \delta^n v_n \mid v_0 = l \right]. \quad (12)$$

This is the utility vector if the principal supplies the unit from round 1 to round ν , independent of the reports. We note that $\hat{u}^0 = 0$ and \hat{u}^ν is an increasing sequence (in both coordinates) contained in V , where $\lim_{\nu \rightarrow \infty} \hat{u}^\nu = \bar{u}^1$. The ordered sequence $\{\hat{u}^\nu\}_{\nu \geq 0}$ defines a polygonal chain P that divides $V \setminus \underline{V}$ into two subsets, V_t and V_b , consisting of those points

in $V \setminus \underline{V}$ that lie above or below P . We also let P_b, P_t be the (closure of the) polygonal chains defined by $\{\underline{u}^\nu\}_{\nu \geq 0}$ and $\{\bar{u}^\nu\}_{\nu \geq 0}$ that correspond to the lower and upper boundaries of V .

We now define a policy (which, as we will see below, is optimal) ignoring for the present the choice of the initial promise.

Definition 2 For all $U \in V$, set

$$p_l = \max \left\{ 0, 1 - \frac{\mu_l - U_l}{(1 - \delta)l} \right\}, \quad p_h = \min \left\{ 1, \frac{U_h}{(1 - \delta)h} \right\}, \quad (13)$$

and

$$U(h) \in P_b, \quad U(l) \in \begin{cases} P_b & \text{if } U \in V_b \\ P_t & \text{if } U \in P_t. \end{cases}$$

Furthermore, if $U \in V_t$, $U(l)$ is chosen such that IC_H binds.

For any U , the current allocation is the efficient one (as long as possible), and the future utilities $U(h)$ and $U(l)$ are chosen so that PK_H and PK_L are satisfied. We show that the closer U is to the lower boundary of V , the higher the principal's payoff is. Therefore, $U(h)$ and $U(l)$ shall be as close to P_b as IC_L and IC_H permit. One can always choose $U(h)$ to be on P_b , because moving $U(h)$ toward P_b makes IC_L less binding. However, one cannot always choose $U(l)$ to be on P_b without violating IC_H , because the high-value agent might have an incentive to mimic the low-value one as we increase $U_h(l)$ and decrease $U_l(l)$. This is where the definition of P plays the role. If the promised utility is $(\hat{u}_h^\nu, \hat{u}_l^\nu) \in P$, the high-value agent is promised the expected utility from foregoing the unit in round 0 and consuming the unit from round 1 to ν . Therefore, if the low-value agent consumes no unit in the current round and is promised a future utility that is on the lower (or frontloading) locus, IC_H holds with equality. Hence, for all utilities above P , $U(l)$ is chosen such that IC_H binds, whereas for all utilities below P , one chooses $U(l)$ to be on the lower locus. It is readily verified that the policy and choices of $U(l), U(h)$ also imply that IC_L binds for all $U \in P_b$.

A surprising property of this policy is that it is independent of the principal's belief. That is, the belief regarding the agent's value does not enter the optimal policy, for a fixed the promised utility. Roughly, this is because the variations of the value function with respect to utilities are so pronounced that the incentive-feasibility constraints rather than the beliefs dictate the policy. However, the belief affects the optimal initial promise and the payoff.

Figure 5 illustrates the dynamics. Given any promised utility vector, the vector $(p_h, p_l) = (1, 0)$ is used (unless U is too close to 0 or μ), and promised utilities depend on the report. A report of l shifts the utility to the right (toward higher values), whereas a report of h shifts it




Figure 5: The set V and the optimal policy for $(\delta, \rho_h, \rho_l, l, h) = (9/10, 1/3, 1/4, 1/4, 1)$.

to the left and toward the lower boundary. Below the interior polygonal chain, utility jumps to the lower boundary after an l report; above it, the jump is determined by IC_H . If the utility starts from the upper boundary, the continuation utility after an l report stays there.

For completeness, we also define the subsets over which promise keeping prevents the efficient choices $(p_h, p_l) = (1, 0)$ from being made. Let $V_h = \{(U_h, U_l) : (U_h, U_l) \in V, U_l \geq \bar{u}_l^1\}$ and $V_l = \{(U_h, U_l) : (U_h, U_l) \in V, U_h \leq \underline{u}_h^1\}$. It is easily verified that $(p_h, p_l) = (1, 0)$ is feasible at U given promise keeping if and only if $U \in V \setminus (V_h \cup V_l)$.

Theorem 3 *Fix $U_0 \in V$; given U_0 , the policy stated above is optimal. The initial promise U^* is in $P_b \cap (V \setminus \underline{V})$, with U^* increasing in the principal's prior belief.*

Furthermore, the value function $W(U_h, U_l, \phi)$ is weakly increasing in U_h along the rays $x = \phi U_h + (1 - \phi)U_l$ for any $\phi \in \{1 - \rho_h, \rho_l\}$.

Given that $U^* \in P_b$ and given the structure of the optimal policy, the promised utility vector never leaves P_b . It is also simple to verify that, as in the i.i.d. case (and by the same arguments), the (one-sided) derivative of W approaches the derivative of \bar{W} as U approaches either μ or the set \underline{V} . As a result, the initial promise U^* is strictly interior.

5 Extensions

Here, we relax two modeling choices. First, we have opted for a discrete time framework because it embeds the case of independent values – a natural starting point for which there is no counterpart in continuous time. This choice comes at a price. With Markovian types, closed-forms (and comparative statics) aren't available in discrete time. As we show, they are in continuous time. Second, we have assumed that the agent's value is binary. As is well known (see Battaglini and Lamba, 2014, for instance), it is difficult to make progress with more types, even with transfers, unless strong assumptions are imposed. In the i.i.d. case, this is nonetheless possible. Below, we consider the case of a continuum of types.

5.1 Continuous Time

To make further progress, we examine the limiting stochastic process of utility and payoff as transitions that are scaled according to the usual Poisson limit, when the variable round length, $\Delta > 0$, is taken to 0, and transition probabilities are set to $\rho_h = \lambda_h \Delta + o(\Delta)$, $\rho_l = \lambda_l \Delta + o(\Delta)$. Formally, we consider a continuous-time Markov chain $(v_t)_{t \geq 0}$ (by definition, a right-continuous process) with state space $\{l, h\}$, transition matrix $((-\lambda_l, \lambda_l), (\lambda_h, -\lambda_h))$, and initial probability $q = \lambda_l / (\lambda_h + \lambda_l)$ of h . Let T_0, T_1, T_2, \dots be the corresponding random times at which the value switches (setting $T_0 = 0$ if the initial state is l such that, by convention, $v_t = l$ on any interval $[T_{2k}, T_{2k+1})$).

The optimal policy defines a tuple of continuous-time processes that follow deterministic trajectories over any interval $[T_{2k}, T_{2k+1})$. First, the belief $(\mu_t)_{t \geq 0}$ of the principal takes values in the range $\{0, 1\}$. Namely, $\mu_t = 0$ over any interval $[T_{2k}, T_{2k+1})$, and $\mu_t = 1$ otherwise. Second, the utilities of the agent $(U_{l,t}, U_{h,t})_{t \geq 0}$ are functions of his type. Finally, the expected payoff of the principal, $(W_t)_{t \geq 0}$, is computed according to his belief μ_t .

The pair of processes $(U_{l,t}, U_{h,t})_{t \geq 0}$ takes values in V , obtained by considering the limit (as $\Delta \rightarrow 0$) of the formulas for $\{\underline{u}^\nu, \bar{u}^\nu\}_{\nu \in \mathbf{N}}$. In particular, one obtains that the lower bound is given in parametric form by³⁷

$$\underline{u}_h(\tau) = \mathbf{E} \left[\int_0^\tau e^{-rt} v_t dt \mid v_0 = h \right], \quad \underline{u}_l(\tau) = \mathbf{E} \left[\int_0^\tau e^{-rt} v_t dt \mid v_0 = l \right],$$

where $\tau \geq 0$ can be interpreted as the requisite time for promises to be fulfilled under the policy that consists of producing the good regardless of the reports until that time is elapsed.

³⁷Here and in what follows, we omit the obvious corresponding analytic expressions. See Appendix C.2.

We define $\mu = \lim_{\tau \rightarrow \infty} (\underline{u}_h(\tau), \underline{u}_l(\tau))$ as the vector of values from getting the good forever.³⁸ The upper boundary is now given by the pairs $(\bar{u}_h(\cdot), \bar{u}_l(\cdot))$, where

$$\bar{u}_h(\tau) = \mathbf{E} \left[\int_{\tau}^{\infty} e^{-rt} v_t dt \mid v_0 = h \right], \quad \bar{u}_l(\tau) = \mathbf{E} \left[\int_{\tau}^{\infty} e^{-rt} v_t dt \mid v_0 = l \right].$$

Finally, we define the set \underline{V} of vectors for which the complete-information payoff is attained. Let $(\underline{U}_h, \underline{U}_l)$ be the largest intersection of the graph of $\underline{u} = (\underline{u}_h, \underline{u}_l)$ with the line $U_l = \frac{\lambda_l}{\lambda_l + r} U_h$. If $\underline{U} = 0$ then $\underline{V} = \{0\}$. If not, define the points $(v_h(\cdot), v_l(\cdot))$ given in parametric form by

$$v_h(\tau) = \mathbf{E} [e^{-r\tau} \underline{U}_{v_\tau} \mid v_0 = h], \quad v_l(\tau) = \mathbf{E} [e^{-r\tau} \underline{U}_{v_\tau} \mid v_0 = l].$$

Intuitively, this is the payoff from waiting for a duration τ from initial value h or l , and then getting \underline{U}_{v_τ} . Let \underline{V} be the payoff vectors in V that lie below the graph of this set of points. Figure 6 illustrates this construction. The boundary of V is smooth except at 0 and μ .³⁹

It is immediately verifiable that \underline{V} has a non-empty interior if and only if (cf. (8))

$$\frac{h - l}{l} > \frac{r}{\lambda_l}.$$

Hence, the complete-information payoff cannot be achieved (except for 0, μ) when the low state is too persistent. However, $\underline{V} \neq \emptyset$ when the agent is sufficiently patient.

How does τ –the denomination of utility on the lower boundary– evolve over time? Along the lower boundary, it evolves continuously. On any interval over which h is continuously reported, it evolves deterministically, with increments

$$\frac{d\tau_h}{dt} = -1.$$

Instead, when l is reported, the evolution is given by

$$\frac{d\tau_l}{dt} = \frac{l}{\mathbf{E}[e^{-r\tau} v_\tau \mid v_0 = l]} - 1.$$

The increment $d\tau_l$ is positive or negative depending upon whether τ maps onto a utility vector in \underline{V} . The interpretation is as in discrete time: whether the agent asks for the unit or

³⁸Explicitly,

$$\mu = \left(h - \frac{\lambda_h}{\lambda_h + \lambda_l + r} (h - l), l + \frac{\lambda_l}{\lambda_h + \lambda_l + r} (h - l) \right).$$

³⁹It is also easy to verify that the limit of the chain defined by \hat{u}^ν lies on the lower boundary: V_b is empty in the continuous-time limit.




Figure 6: Incentive-feasible set for $(r, \lambda_h, \lambda_l, l, h) = (1, 10/4, 1/4, 1/4, 1)$.

not, he must pay a fixed cost of 1. However, conditional on foregoing the unit and reporting l , he is compensated by a term that equals the rate of substitution between the opportunity flow cost of giving up the current unit, l , and the value of getting it at the most propitious future time less than τ : the later being the better given his current type, this means his expected (discounted) value at this upper bound τ .

The evolution of utility is not continuous for utilities that are not on the lower boundary of V . A high report leads to a vertical jump in the utility of the low type down to the lower boundary. See Figure 6. This change is intuitive because by promise keeping, the utility of the high-type agent cannot jump because such an instantaneous report has only a minute impact on his flow utility. A low report, however, leads to a drift in the type's utility.

Continuous time allows to explicitly solve for the principal's value function. Because her belief is degenerate, except at the initial instant, we write $W_h(\tau)$ (resp., $W_l(\tau)$) for the payoff when (she assigns probability one to the event that) the agent's valuation is currently high (resp. low). See Appendix C.2 for a derivation of the solution and the proof of the following.

Lemma 7 *The value $W(\tau) := qW_h(\tau) + (1-q)W_l(\tau)$ decreases pointwise in persistence $1/p$, where $\lambda_h = p\bar{\lambda}_h$, $\lambda_l = p\bar{\lambda}_l$, for some fixed $\bar{\lambda}_h, \bar{\lambda}_l$ for all τ ,*

$$\lim_{p \rightarrow \infty} W(\tau) = \bar{W}(\tau), \quad \lim_{p \rightarrow 0} \max_{\tau} W(\tau) = \max\{\mu - c, 0\}.$$

Hence, persistence hurts the principal’s payoff. With independent types, the agent’s preferences are quasilinear in promised utility such that the only source of inefficiency derives from the bounds on this currency. When types are correlated, the promised utility is no longer independent of today’s types in the agent’s preferences, reducing the degree to which this mechanism can be used to efficiently provide incentives. With perfectly persistent types, there is no longer any leeway, and we are back to the inefficient static outcome. Figure 7 illustrates the value function for two levels of persistence and compares it to the complete-information payoff evaluated along the lower locus, \bar{W} (the lower envelope of three curves).

What about the agent’s utility? We note that the utility of both types is increasing in τ . Indeed, because a low type is always willing to claim that his value is high, we may compute his utility as the time over which he would obtain the good if he continuously claimed to be of the high type, which is precisely the definition of τ . However, persistence plays an ambiguous role in determining the agent’s utility: perfect persistence is his favorite outcome if $\mu > c$. Hence, always providing the good is the best option in the static game. Conversely, perfect persistence is worse if $\mu < c$. Hence, persistence tends to improve the agent’s situation when $\mu > c$.⁴⁰ As $r \rightarrow 0$, the principal’s value converges to the complete information payoff $q(h-c)$. We conclude with a rate of convergence without further discussion given the detailed comparison with Jackson and Sonnenschein (2007) provided in Section 3.4.

Lemma 8 *It holds that*

$$|\max_{\tau} W(\tau) - q(h-c)| = \mathcal{O}(r).$$

5.2 Continuous Types

Throughout our analysis, attention has been restricted to two types. This assumption makes the analysis tractable. Here, we explain which features of the solution are robust, at least when types are i.i.d. In particular, backloading occurs in the sense that the allocation is eventually insensitive to the agent’s private information: polarization occurs with both long-run outcomes being possible. On the other hand, even in the first round, the allocation isn’t efficient; in fact, it isn’t even bang-bang. Because transfers aren’t available, some intermediate types obtain the good with interior probability, even with i.i.d. types.

Assume that types are drawn i.i.d. from some distribution F with support $[\underline{v}, 1]$, $\underline{v} \in [0, 1)$ and density $f > 0$ on $[\underline{v}, 1]$. In Proposition 1, we specialize to power distributions $F(v) = v^a$, $a \geq 1$. Let $\mu = \mathbf{E}[v]$ be the type’s expected value and hence also the highest possible utility

⁴⁰However, this convergence is not necessarily monotone, which is easy to verify via examples.




Figure 7: Value function and complete information payoffs as a function of τ (here, $(\lambda_l, \lambda_h, r, l, h, c) = (p/4, 10p/4, 1, 1/4, 1, 2/5)$ and $p = 1, 1/4$).

promise. As before, we start with the complete-information benchmark, with a lemma whose proof is straightforward and omitted. A policy is *threshold* if, for every U , the assignment is non-decreasing in the type and takes only values 0 and 1.

Lemma 9 *The complete information payoff \bar{W} is strictly concave. The complete information policy is unique and threshold, where the threshold v^* is continuously decreasing from 1 to \underline{v} as U varies from 0 to μ . Given the initial promise U , utility remains constant at U .*

Noteworthy is the strict concavity of \bar{W} over its entire domain. With a continuum of types, the threshold type above which the unit is delivered can be tailored to the promised utility in a way that mitigates the fact that this utility might be above or below first best. Given a promised utility $U \in [0, \mu]$, there exists a threshold v^* such that the good is provided if and only if the type is above v^* . As before, utility does not evolve over time. Returning to the case in which the agent privately observes values, we have the following.⁴¹

Theorem 4 *The value function is strictly concave in U , continuously differentiable, and strictly below the complete information payoff (except for $U = 0, \mu$). Given $U \in (0, \mu)$, the optimal policy $p : [\underline{v}, 1] \rightarrow [0, 1]$ is not a threshold policy.*

⁴¹See Appendix C.3.

One might have expected the optimal policy to be threshold. However, without transfers, incentive compatibility requires the continuation utility to vary with reports, yet the principal's payoff is not linear. Consider a small open interval of types around a candidate threshold. From the principal's perspective, conditional on the type being in this interval, the outcome is a lottery over giving the unit or not, as well as over continuation payoffs. Replacing this lottery with its expected value leaves the agent virtually indifferent; but it benefits the principal, given the strict concavity of her payoff function.

Dynamics cannot be described as explicitly as with binary values. The TW-martingale remains useful: W' is a bounded martingale, as U -a.e.,

$$W'(U) = \int_{\underline{v}}^1 W'(\mathcal{U}(U, v)) dF(v),$$

where $\mathcal{U} : [0, \mu] \times [\underline{v}, 1] \rightarrow [0, \mu]$ is the optimal policy mapping current utility and report into continuation utility. Because $\mathcal{U}(U, \cdot)$ is not constant, except at $U = 0, \mu$, and W is strictly concave, it must be that the limit is 0 or μ , and both must occur with positive probability.

Lemma 10 *Given any initial level U_0 , the utility process U_n converges to $\{0, \mu\}$, with both limits having strictly positive probability if $\underline{v} > 0$ (If $\underline{v} = 0$, 0 occurs a.s.).*

What is then the optimal policy? In Appendix C.3, we prove the following.

Proposition 1 *Suppose that $F(v) = v^a$, $a \geq 1$. There exists $U^{**} \in (0, \mu)$ such that*

1. *for any $U < U^{**}$, there exists v_1 such that $p(v) = 0$ for $v \in [0, v_1]$ and $p(v)$ is strictly increasing (and continuous) when $v \in (v_1, 1]$. The constraint $U(1) \geq 0$ binds, while the constraint $p(1) \leq 1$ does not.*
2. *for any $U \geq U^{**}$, there exists $0 \leq v_1 \leq v_2 \leq 1$ such that $p(v) = 0$ for $v \leq v_1$, $p(v)$ is strictly increasing (and continuous) when $v \in (v_1, v_2)$ and $p(v) = 1$ for $v \geq v_2$. The constraints $U(0) \leq \mu$ and $U(1) \geq 0$ do not bind.*

Figure 8 illustrates the optimal policy for some $U \geq U^{**}$.⁴² Indirect implementation is more difficult, as the agent might be assigned the good with interior probability. Hence, the variable fee of the two-part tariff that we describe must be extended to a nonlinear schedule in which the agent pays a price for each “share” of the good that he would like.

⁴²The thresholds are $v_1 = .5, v_2 \approx .575, U(0) \approx .412$, and $U(1) \approx .384$.




Figure 8: Optimal policy for $\delta = .95, c = .4$, and v uniform on $[0, 1]$.

Markovian Types. We see little hope for analytic results with additional types in the Markovian case. In fact, even with three types, we are unable to characterize the incentive-feasible set. It is clear that frontloading is the worst policy for the low type, given some promised utility to the high type, and backloading is the best, but what of maximizing a medium type’s utility given a pair of utilities to the low and high type? It appears that the convex hull of utilities from frontloading and backloading policies traces out the lowest utility that a medium type can obtain for any such pair, but the set of incentive-feasible payoffs has full dimension. His maximum utility obtains when one of his incentive constraints binds, but there are two possibilities, according to the binding constraint. This yields two hypersurfaces that do not appear to admit closed-form solutions. The analysis of the two-type case suggests that the optimal policy follows a path of utility triples on such a boundary.

6 Concluding Comments

Here, we discuss some extensions.

Renegotiation-Proofness. The optimal policy, as described in Sections 3–4, is clearly not renegotiation-proof, unlike with transfers (see Battaglini, 2005). After a history of reports such that the promised utility is zero, both parties would be better off by renegeing and starting afresh. There are several ways to define renegotiation-proofness. Strong-renegotiation (Farrell and Maskin, 1989) implies a lower bound on the utility vectors visited (except in the event that μ is so low that it makes the relationship altogether unprofitable, and so $U^* = 0$.) However, the structure of the optimal policy can still be derived from the same observations. The low-type incentive-compatibility condition and promise keeping specify the continuation

utilities, unless a boundary is reached regardless of whether it is the lower boundary (that must serve as a lower reflecting barrier) or the upper absorbing boundary μ .

Public Signals. While assuming no statistical evidence whatsoever allows us to clarify how the principal can exploit the repeated allocation decision to mitigate the inefficiency entailed by private information, there are many applications for which such evidence is available. This public signal depends on the current type and possibly on the action chosen by the principal. For instance, if the decision is to fill a position (as in labor market applications), feedback on the quality of the applicant only obtains if he is hired. Instead, if the good insures the agent against a risk with a cost that might be either high or low, the principal might discover that the agent's claim was warranted only if she fails to provide a good.

Incomplete Information Regarding the Process. Thus far, we have assumed that the agent's type is drawn from a distribution that is common knowledge. This feature is obviously an extreme assumption. In practice, the agent might have superior information regarding the frequency with which high values arrive. If the agent knows the distribution from the beginning, the revelation principle applies, and it is a matter of revisiting the analysis from Section 3 with an incentive compatibility constraint at time 0.

Alternatively, the agent might not possess such information initially but be able to determine the underlying distribution from successive arrivals. This is the more challenging case in which the agent himself is learning about q (or, more generally, the transition matrix) as time passes. In that case, the agent's belief might be private (in the event that he has deviated in the past). Therefore, it is necessary to enlarge the set of reports. A mechanism is now a map from the principal's belief μ (regarding the agent's belief), a report by the agent of this belief, denoted ν , and his report on his current type (h or l) onto a decision of whether to allocate the good and the promised continuation utility.

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A Missing Proof For Section 3

Proof of Theorem 1. Based on PK and the binding IC_L , we solve for u_h, u_l as a function of p_h, p_l and U :

$$u_h = \frac{U - (1 - \delta)p_h(qh + (1 - q)l)}{\delta}, \quad (14)$$

$$u_l = \frac{U - (1 - \delta)(p_h q(h - l) + p_l l)}{\delta}. \quad (15)$$

We want to show that an optimal policy is such that (i) either u_h as defined in (14) equals 0 or $p_h = 1$; and (ii) either u_l as defined in (15) equals \bar{v} or $p_l = 0$. Write $W(U; p_h, p_l)$ for the maximum payoff from using p_h, p_l as probabilities of assigning the good, and using promised utilities as given by (14)–(15) (followed by the optimal policy from the period that follows). Substituting u_h and u_l into (OBJ), we get, from the fundamental theorem of calculus, for any fixed $p_h^1 < p_h^2$ such that the corresponding utilities u_h are interior,

$$W(U; p_h^2, p_l) - W(U; p_h^1, p_l) = \int_{p_h^1}^{p_h^2} \{(1 - \delta)q(h - c - (1 - q)(h - l)W'(u_l) - \bar{v}W'(u_h))\} dp_h.$$

This expression decreases (pointwise) in $W'(u_h)$ and $W'(u_l)$. Recall that $W'(u)$ is bounded from above by $1 - c/h$. Hence, plugging in the upper bound for W' , we obtain that $W(U; p_h^2, p_l) - W(U; p_h^1, p_l) \geq 0$. It follows that there is no loss (and possibly a gain) in increasing p_h , unless feasibility prevents this. An entirely analogous reasoning implies that $W(U; p_h, p_l)$ is nonincreasing in p_l .

It is immediate that $u_h \leq u_l$ and both u_h, u_l decreases in p_h, p_l . Therefore, either $u_h \geq 0$ binds or p_h equals 1. Similarly, either $u_l \leq \bar{v}$ binds or p_l equals 0. ■

Proof of Lemma 2. We start the proof with some notation and preliminary remarks. First, given any interval $I \subset [0, \mu]$, we write $I_h := \left[\frac{a - (1 - \delta)\mu}{\delta}, \frac{b - (1 - \delta)\mu}{\delta} \right] \cap [0, \mu]$ and $I_l := \left[\frac{a - (1 - \delta)\underline{U}}{\delta}, \frac{b - (1 - \delta)\underline{U}}{\delta} \right] \cap [0, \mu]$ where $I = [a, b]$; we also write $[a, b]_h$, etc. Furthermore we use the (ordered) sequence of subscripts to indicate the composition of such maps, *e.g.*, $I_{lh} = (I_l)_h$. Finally, given some interval I , we write $\ell(I)$ for its length.

Second, we note that, for any interval $I \subset [\underline{U}, \bar{U}]$, identically, for $U \in I$, it holds that

$$W(U) = (1 - \delta)(qh - c) + \delta q W\left(\frac{U - (1 - \delta)\mu}{\delta}\right) + \delta(1 - q)W\left(\frac{U - (1 - \delta)\underline{U}}{\delta}\right), \quad (16)$$

and hence, over this interval, it follows by differentiation that, a.e. on I ,

$$W'(U) = qW'(u_h) + (1 - q)W'(u_l).$$

Similarly, for any interval $I \subset [\bar{U}, \mu]$, identically, for $U \in I$,

$$W(U) = (1 - q) \left(U - c - (U - \mu) \frac{c}{l} \right) + (1 - \delta)q(\mu - c) + \delta q W \left(\frac{U - (1 - \delta)\mu}{\delta} \right), \quad (17)$$

and so a.e.,

$$W'(U) = -(1 - q)(c/l - 1) + qW'(u_h).$$

That is, the slope of W at a point (or an interval) is an average of the slopes at u_h, u_l , and this holds also on $[\bar{U}, \mu]$, with the convention that its slope at $u_l = \mu$ is given by $1 - c/l$. By weak concavity of W , if W is affine on I , then it must be affine on both I_h and I_l (with the convention that it is trivially affine at μ). We make the following observations.

1. For any $I \subseteq (\underline{U}, \mu)$ (of positive length) such that W is affine on I , $\ell(I_h \cap I) = \ell(I_l \cap I) = 0$. If not, then we note that, because the slope on I is the average of the other two, all three must have the same slope (since two intersect, and so have the same slope). But then the convex hull of the three has the same slope (by weak concavity). We thus obtain an interval $I' = \text{co}\{I_l, I_h\}$ of strictly greater length (note that $\ell(I_h) = \ell(I)/\delta$, and similarly $\ell(I_l) = \ell(I)/\delta$ unless I_l intersects μ). It must then be that I'_h or I'_l intersect I , and we can repeat this operation. This contradicts the fact the slope of W on $[0, \bar{U}]$ is $(1 - c/h)$, yet $W(\mu) = \mu - c$.
2. It follows that there is no interval $I \subseteq [\underline{U}, \mu]$ on which W has slope $(1 - c/h)$ (because then W would have this slope on $I' := \text{co}\{\underline{U}\} \cup I$, and yet I' would intersect I'_l .) Similarly, there cannot be an interval $I \subseteq [\underline{U}, \mu]$ on which W has slope $1 - c/l$.
3. It immediately follows from 2 that $W < \bar{W}$ on (\underline{U}, μ) : if there is a $U \in (\underline{U}, \mu)$ such that $W(U) = \bar{W}(U)$, then by concavity again (and the fact that the two slopes involved are the two possible values of the slope of \bar{W}), W must either have slope $(1 - c/h)$ on $[0, U]$, or $1 - c/l$ on $[U, \mu]$, both being impossible.
4. Next, suppose that there exists an interval $I \subset [\underline{U}, \mu)$ of length $\varepsilon > 0$ such that W is affine on I . There might be many such intervals; consider the one with the smallest lower extremity. Furthermore, without loss, given this lower extremity, pick I so that it has maximum length, that W is affine on I , but on no proper superset of I . Let $I := [a, b]$. We claim that $I_h \in [0, \underline{U}]$. Suppose not. Note that I_h cannot overlap with I (by point 1). Hence, either I_h is contained in $[0, \underline{U}]$, or it is contained in $[\underline{U}, a]$, or $\underline{U} \in (a, b)_h$. This last possibility cannot occur, because W must be affine on $(a, b)_h$, yet the slope on (a_h, \underline{U}) is equal to $(1 - c/h)$, while by point 2 it must be strictly less

on (\underline{U}, b_h) . It cannot be contained in $[\underline{U}, a]$, because $\ell(I_h) = \ell(I)/\delta > \ell(I)$, and this would contradict the hypothesis that I was the lowest interval in $[\underline{U}, \mu]$ of length ε over which W is affine.

We next observe that I_l cannot intersect I . Assume $b \leq \bar{U}$. Hence, we have that I_l is an interval over which W is affine, and such that $\ell(I_l) = \ell(I)/\delta$. Let $\varepsilon' := \ell(I)/\delta$. By the same reasoning as before, we can find $I' \subset [\underline{U}, \mu)$ of length $\varepsilon' > 0$ such that W is affine on I' , and such that $I'_h \subset [0, \bar{U}]$. Repeating the same argument as often as necessary, we conclude that there must be an interval $J \subset [\underline{U}, \mu)$ such that (i) W is affine on J , $J = [a', b']$, (ii) $b' \geq \bar{U}$, there exists no interval of equal or greater length in $[\underline{U}, \mu)$ over which W would be affine. By the same argument yet again, J_h must be contained in $[0, \underline{U}]$. Yet the assumption that $\delta > 1/2$ is equivalent to $\bar{U}_h > \underline{U}$, and so this is a contradiction. Hence, there exists no interval in (\underline{U}, μ) over which W is affine, and so W must be strictly concave.

This concludes the proof.

Differentiability follows from an argument that follows Benveniste and Scheinkman (1979), using some induction. We note that W is differentiable on $(0, \underline{U})$. Fix $U > \underline{U}$ such that $U_h \in (0, \underline{U})$. Consider the following perturbation of the optimal policy. Fix $\varepsilon = (p - \bar{p})^2$, for some $\bar{p} \in (0, 1)$ to be determined. With probability $\varepsilon > 0$, the report is ignored, the good is supplied with probability $p \in [0, 1]$ and the next value is U_l (Otherwise, the optimal policy is implemented). Because this event is independent of the report, the IC constraints are still satisfied. Note that, for $p = 0$, this yields a strictly lower utility than U to the agent, while it yields a strictly higher utility for $p = 1$. As it varies continuously, there is some critical value –defined as \bar{p} – that makes the agent indifferent between both policies. By varying p , we may thus generate all utilities within some interval $(U - \nu, U + \nu)$, for some $\nu > 0$, and the payoff \tilde{W} that we obtain in this fashion is continuously differentiable in $U' \in (U - \nu, U + \nu)$. It follows that the concave function W is minimized by a continuously differentiable function \tilde{W} –hence, it must be as well. ■

B Missing Proof For Section 4

Proof of Lemma 5. Substituting the agent's expected value in each round into (6) and (7), we obtain that

$$\begin{aligned}\underline{u}_h^\nu &= (1 - \delta^\nu)\mu_h + \delta^\nu(1 - q)(\mu_h - \mu_l)(1 - \kappa^\nu), & \underline{u}_l^\nu &= (1 - \delta^\nu)\mu_l - \delta^\nu q(\mu_h - \mu_l)(1 - \kappa^\nu), \\ \bar{u}_h^\nu &= \delta^\nu\mu_h - \delta^\nu(1 - q)(\mu_h - \mu_l)(1 - \kappa^\nu), & \bar{u}_l^\nu &= \delta^\nu\mu_l + \delta^\nu q(\mu_h - \mu_l)(1 - \kappa^\nu).\end{aligned}$$

Let W denote the set $\text{co}\{\bar{u}^\nu, \underline{u}^\nu : \nu \geq 0\}$. The point \bar{u}^0 is supported by $(p_h, p_l) = (1, 1), U(h) = U(l) = (\mu_h, \mu_l)$. For $\nu \geq 1$, \bar{u}^ν is supported by $(p_h, p_l) = (0, 0), U(h) = U(l) = \bar{u}^{\nu-1}$. The point \underline{u}^0 is supported by $(p_h, p_l) = (0, 0), U(h) = U(l) = (0, 0)$. For $\nu \geq 1$, \underline{u}^ν is supported by $(p_h, p_l) = (1, 1), U(h) = U(l) = \underline{u}^{\nu-1}$. Therefore, we have $W \subset \mathcal{B}(W)$. This implies that $\mathcal{B}(W) \subset V$.

We define four sequences as follows. First, for $\nu \geq 0$, let

$$\begin{aligned}\bar{w}_h^\nu &= \delta^\nu(1 - \kappa^\nu)(1 - q)\mu_l, \\ \bar{w}_l^\nu &= \delta^\nu(1 - q + \kappa^\nu q)\mu_l,\end{aligned}$$

and set $\bar{w}^\nu = (\bar{w}_h^\nu, \bar{w}_l^\nu)$. Second, for $\nu \geq 0$, let

$$\begin{aligned}\underline{w}_h^\nu &= \mu_h - \delta^\nu(1 - \kappa^\nu)(1 - q)\mu_l, \\ \underline{w}_l^\nu &= \mu_l - \delta^\nu(1 - q + \kappa^\nu q)\mu_l,\end{aligned}$$

and set $\underline{w}^\nu = (\underline{w}_h^\nu, \underline{w}_l^\nu)$. For any $\nu \geq 1$, \bar{w}^ν is supported by $(p_h, p_l) = (0, 0), U(h) = U(l) = \bar{w}^{\nu-1}$, and \underline{w}^ν is supported by $(p_h, p_l) = (1, 1), U(h) = U(l) = \underline{w}^{\nu-1}$. The sequence \bar{w}^ν starts at $\bar{w}^0 = (0, \mu_l)$ with $\lim_{\nu \rightarrow \infty} \bar{w}^\nu = 0$. Similarly, \underline{w}^ν starts at $\underline{w}^0 = (\mu_h, 0)$ and $\lim_{\nu \rightarrow \infty} \underline{w}^\nu = \mu$. We define a set sequence as follows:

$$W^\nu = \text{co}(\{\bar{u}^k, \underline{u}^k : 0 \leq k \leq \nu\} \cup \{\bar{w}^\nu, \underline{w}^\nu\}).$$

It is obvious that $V \subset \mathcal{B}(W^0) \subset W^0$. To prove that $V = W$, it suffices to show that $W^\nu = \mathcal{B}(W^{\nu-1})$ and $\lim_{\nu \rightarrow \infty} W^\nu = W$.

For any $\nu \geq 1$, we define the supremum score in direction (λ_1, λ_2) given $W^{\nu-1}$ as $K((\lambda_1, \lambda_2), W^{\nu-1}) = \sup_{p_h, p_l, U(h), U(l)}(\lambda_1 U_h + \lambda_2 U_l)$, subject to (2)–(5), $p_h, p_l \in [0, 1]$, and $U(h), U(l) \in W^{\nu-1}$. The set $\mathcal{B}(W^{\nu-1})$ is given by

$$\bigcap_{(\lambda_1, \lambda_2)} \{(U_h, U_l) : \lambda_1 U_h + \lambda_2 U_l \leq K((\lambda_1, \lambda_2), W^{\nu-1})\}.$$

Without loss of generality, we focus on directions $(1, -\lambda)$ and $(-1, \lambda)$ for all $\lambda \geq 0$. We define three sequences of slopes as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}\lambda_1^\nu &= \frac{(1-q)(\delta\kappa-1)\kappa^\nu(\mu_h-\mu_l) - (1-\delta)(q\mu_h + (1-q)\mu_l)}{q(1-\delta\kappa)\kappa^\nu(\mu_h-\mu_l) - (1-\delta)(q\mu_h + (1-q)\mu_l)}, \\ \lambda_2^\nu &= \frac{1 - (1-q)(1-\kappa^\nu)}{q(1-\kappa^\nu)}, \\ \lambda_3^\nu &= \frac{(1-q)(1-\kappa^\nu)}{q\kappa^\nu + (1-q)}.\end{aligned}$$

It is easy to verify that

$$\lambda_1^\nu = \frac{\bar{u}_h^\nu - \bar{u}_h^{\nu+1}}{\bar{u}_l^\nu - \bar{u}_l^{\nu+1}} = \frac{\underline{u}_h^\nu - \underline{u}_h^{\nu+1}}{\underline{u}_l^\nu - \underline{u}_l^{\nu+1}}, \quad \lambda_2^\nu = \frac{\bar{u}_h^\nu - \bar{w}_h^\nu}{\bar{u}_l^\nu - \bar{w}_l^\nu} = \frac{\underline{u}_h^\nu - \underline{w}_h^\nu}{\underline{u}_l^\nu - \underline{w}_l^\nu}, \quad \lambda_3^\nu = \frac{\bar{w}_h^\nu - 0}{\bar{w}_l^\nu - 0} = \frac{\underline{w}_h^\nu - \mu_h}{\underline{w}_l^\nu - \mu_l}.$$

When $(\lambda_1, \lambda_2) = (-1, \lambda)$, the supremum score as we vary λ is

$$K((-1, \lambda), W^{\nu-1}) = \begin{cases} (-1, \lambda) \cdot (0, 0) & \text{if } \lambda \in [0, \lambda_3^\nu] \\ (-1, \lambda) \cdot \bar{w}^\nu & \text{if } \lambda \in [\lambda_3^\nu, \lambda_2^\nu] \\ (-1, \lambda) \cdot \bar{u}^\nu & \text{if } \lambda \in [\lambda_2^\nu, \lambda_1^{\nu-1}] \\ (-1, \lambda) \cdot \bar{u}^{\nu-1} & \text{if } \lambda \in [\lambda_1^{\nu-1}, \lambda_1^{\nu-2}] \\ \dots & \\ (-1, \lambda) \cdot \bar{u}^0 & \text{if } \lambda \in [\lambda_1^0, \infty). \end{cases}$$

Similarly, when $(\lambda_1, \lambda_2) = (1, -\lambda)$, we have

$$K((1, -\lambda), W^{\nu-1}) = \begin{cases} (1, -\lambda) \cdot (\mu_h, \mu_l) & \text{if } \lambda \in [0, \lambda_3^\nu] \\ (1, -\lambda) \cdot \underline{w}^\nu & \text{if } \lambda \in [\lambda_3^\nu, \lambda_2^\nu] \\ (1, -\lambda) \cdot \underline{u}^\nu & \text{if } \lambda \in [\lambda_2^\nu, \lambda_1^{\nu-1}] \\ (1, -\lambda) \cdot \underline{u}^{\nu-1} & \text{if } \lambda \in [\lambda_1^{\nu-1}, \lambda_1^{\nu-2}] \\ \dots & \\ (1, -\lambda) \cdot \underline{u}^0 & \text{if } \lambda \in [\lambda_1^0, \infty). \end{cases}$$

Therefore, we have $W^\nu = \mathcal{B}(W^{\nu-1})$. Note that this method only works when parameters are such that $\lambda_3^\nu \leq \lambda_2^\nu \leq \lambda_1^{\nu-1}$ for all $\nu \geq 1$. If $\rho_l/(1-\rho_h) \geq l/h$, the proof stated above applies. Otherwise, the following proof applies.

We define four sequences as follows. First, for $0 \leq m \leq \nu$, let

$$\begin{aligned}\bar{w}_h(m, \nu) &= \delta^{\nu-m}(q\mu_h(1-\delta^m) + (1-q)\mu_l) - (1-q)(\delta\kappa)^{\nu-m}(\mu_h((\delta\kappa)^m - 1) + \mu_l), \\ \bar{w}_l(m, \nu) &= \delta^{\nu-m}(q\mu_h(1-\delta^m) + (1-q)\mu_l) + q(\delta\kappa)^{\nu-m}(\mu_h((\delta\kappa)^m - 1) + \mu_l),\end{aligned}$$

and set $\bar{w}(m, \nu) = (\bar{w}_h(m, \nu), \bar{w}_l(m, \nu))$. Second, for $0 \leq m \leq \nu$, let

$$\begin{aligned}\underline{w}_h(m, \nu) &= \frac{(1-q)\delta^\nu \kappa^\nu (\mu_h (\delta^m \kappa^m - 1) + \mu_l) + \kappa^m (\mu_h \delta^m - \delta^\nu (q\mu_h (1 - \delta^m) + (1-q)\mu_l))}{\delta^m \kappa^m}, \\ \underline{w}_l(m, \nu) &= \frac{-q\delta^\nu \kappa^\nu (\mu_h (\delta^m \kappa^m - 1) + \mu_l) + \kappa^m (\mu_l \delta^m - \delta^\nu (q\mu_h (1 - \delta^m) + (1-q)\mu_l))}{\delta^m \kappa^m},\end{aligned}$$

and set $\underline{w}(m, \nu) = (\underline{w}_h(m, \nu), \underline{w}_l(m, \nu))$. Fixing ν , the sequence $\bar{w}(m, \nu)$ is increasing (in both its arguments) as m increases, with $\lim_{\nu \rightarrow \infty} \bar{w}(\nu - m, \nu) = \bar{u}^m$. Similarly, fixing ν , $\underline{w}(m, \nu)$ is decreasing as m increases, $\lim_{\nu \rightarrow \infty} \underline{w}(\nu - m, \nu) = \underline{u}^m$.

Let $\bar{W}(\nu) = \{\bar{w}(m, \nu) : 0 \leq m \leq \nu\}$ and $\underline{W}(\nu) = \{\underline{w}(m, \nu) : 0 \leq m \leq \nu\}$. We define a set sequence as follows:

$$W(\nu) = \text{co}(\{(0, 0), (\mu_h, \mu_l)\} \cup \bar{W}(\nu) \cup \underline{W}(\nu)).$$

Since $W(0)$ equals $[0, \mu_h] \times [0, \mu_l]$, it is obvious that $V \subset \mathcal{B}(W(0)) \subset W(0)$. To prove that $V = W := \text{co}\{\bar{u}^\nu, \underline{u}^\nu : \nu \geq 0\}$, it suffices to show that $W(\nu) = \mathcal{B}(W(\nu - 1))$ and $\lim_{\nu \rightarrow \infty} W(\nu) = W$. The rest of the proof is similar to the first part and hence omitted. ■

Proof of Lemma 6. It will be useful in this proof and those that follow to define the operator \mathcal{B}_{ij} , $i, j = 0, 1$. Given an arbitrary $A \subset [0, \mu_h] \times [0, \mu_l]$, let

$$\mathcal{B}_{ij}(A) := \{(U_h, U_l) \in [0, \mu_h] \times [0, \mu_l] : U(h), U(l) \in A \text{ solving (2)–(5) for } (p_h, p_l) = (i, j)\},$$

and similarly $\mathcal{B}_i(A), \mathcal{B}_j(A)$ when only p_h or p_l is constrained.

The first step is to compute V_0 , the largest set such that $V_0 \subset \mathcal{B}_0(V_0)$. Plainly, this is a proper subset of V , because any promise $U_l \in (\delta\rho_l\mu_h + \delta(1 - \rho_l)\mu_l, \mu_l]$ requires that p_l be strictly positive.

We first show that $\bar{V} \in V_0$. Substituting the probability of being h in round ν conditional on the current type into (11), we obtain the analytic expression of $\{v^\nu\}_{\nu \geq 1}$:

$$v_h^\nu = \delta^\nu ((1-q)\underline{U}_l + q\underline{U}_h + (1-q)\kappa^\nu(\underline{U}_h - \underline{U}_l)), v_l^\nu = \delta^\nu ((1-q)\underline{U}_l + q\underline{U}_h - q\kappa^\nu(\underline{U}_h - \underline{U}_l)).$$

Note that the sequence $\{v^\nu\}$ solves the system of equations, for all $\nu \geq 0$:

$$v_h^{\nu+1} = \delta(1 - \rho_h)v_h^\nu + \delta\rho_h v_l^\nu, \quad v_l^{\nu+1} = \delta(1 - \rho_l)v_l^\nu + \delta\rho_l v_h^\nu,$$

and $v_l^1 = v_l^0$ (which is easily verified given the condition that $v^0 = \underline{U}$ lies on the line $U_l = \frac{\delta\rho_l}{1 - \delta(1 - \rho_l)}U_h$). For any $\nu \geq 1$, v^ν can be supported by setting $p_h = p_l = 0$ and $U(h) = U(l) = v^{\nu-1}$. Therefore, v^ν can be delivered with p_l being 0 and continuation

utilities in \bar{V} . We next show that v^0 can itself be obtained with continuation utilities in \bar{V} . This one is obtained by setting $(p_h, p_l) = (1, 0)$, setting IC_L as a binding constraint, and $U(l) = v^0$ (again one can check that $U(h)$ is in \bar{V} and that IC_H holds). This suffices to show that $\bar{V} \subseteq V_0$, because the extreme points of \bar{V} can be supported with p_l being 0 and continuation utilities in the set, and all other utility vectors in \bar{V} can be written as a convex combination of these extreme points.

The proof that $V_0 \subset \bar{V}$ follows the similar lines as determining the boundaries of V in the proof of Lemma 5: one considers a sequence of programs, setting $\hat{W}^0 = V$ and defining recursively the supremum score in direction (λ_1, λ_2) given $\hat{W}^{\nu-1}$ as $K((\lambda_1, \lambda_2), \hat{W}^{\nu-1}) = \sup_{p_h, p_l, U(h), U(l)} \lambda_1 U_h + \lambda_2 U_l$, subject to (2)–(5), $p_l = 0$, $p_h \in [0, 1]$, $U(h), U(l) \in \hat{W}^{\nu-1}$, $\lambda \cdot U(h) \leq \lambda \cdot U$ and $\lambda \cdot U(l) \leq \lambda \cdot U$. The set $\mathcal{B}(\hat{W}^{\nu-1})$ is given by

$$\bigcap_{(\lambda_1, \lambda_2)} \left\{ (U_h, U_l) \in V : \lambda_1 U_h + \lambda_2 U_l \leq K((\lambda_1, \lambda_2), \hat{W}^{\nu-1}) \right\},$$

and the set $\hat{W}^\nu = \mathcal{B}(\hat{W}^{\nu-1})$ obtains by considering an appropriate choice of λ_1, λ_2 . More precisely, we always set $\lambda_2 = 1$, and for $\nu = 1$, pick $\lambda_1 = 0$. This gives $\hat{W}^1 = V \cap \{U : U_l \leq v_l^0\}$. We then pick (for every $\nu \geq 2$) as direction λ the vector $(-(v_l^{\nu-1} - v_l^\nu)/(v_h^{\nu-1} - v_h^\nu), 1)$, and as a result obtain that

$$V_0 \subseteq \hat{W}^\nu = \hat{W}^{\nu-1} \cap \left\{ U : U_l - v_l^\nu \leq \frac{v_l^{\nu-1} - v_l^\nu}{v_h^{\nu-1} - v_h^\nu} (U_h - v_h^\nu) \right\}.$$

It follows that $V_0 \subset \bar{V}$.

Next, we argue that this achieves the complete-information payoff. First, note that $\bar{V} \subseteq V \cap \{U : U_l \leq v_l^*\}$. In this region, it is clear that any policy that never gives the unit to the low type while delivering the promised utility to the high type must be optimal. This is a feature of the policy that we have described to obtain the boundary of V (and plainly it extends to utilities U below this boundary).

Finally, one must show that above it the complete-information payoff cannot be achieved. It follows from the definition of \bar{V} as the largest fixed point of \mathcal{B}_0 that starting from any utility vector $U \in V \setminus \bar{V}$, $U \neq \mu$, there is a positive probability that the unit is given (after some history that has positive probability) to the low type. This implies that the complete-information payoff cannot be achieved in case $U \leq v^*$. For $U \geq v^*$, achieving the complete-information payoff requires that $p_h = 1$ for all histories, but it is not hard to check that the smallest fixed point of \mathcal{B}_1 is not contained in $V \cap \{U : U \geq v^*\}$, from which it follows that suboptimal continuation payoffs are collected with positive probability. ■

Proof of Theorem 2 and 3. We start the proof by defining the function $W : V \times \{\rho_l, 1 - \rho_h\} \rightarrow \mathbf{R} \cup \{-\infty\}$, that solves the following program, for all $(U_h, U_l) \in V$, and $\phi \in \{\rho_l, 1 - \rho_h\}$,

$$\begin{aligned} W(U_h, U_l, \phi) &= \sup \{ \phi ((1 - \delta)p_h(h - c) + \delta W(U_h(h), U_l(h), 1 - \rho_h)) \\ &+ (1 - \phi) ((1 - \delta)p_l(l - c) + \delta W(U_h(l), U_l(l), \rho_l)) \}, \end{aligned}$$

over $(p_l, p_h) \in [0, 1]^2$, and $U(h), U(l) \in V$ subject to PK_H, PK_L, IC_L . Note that IC_H is dropped so this is a relaxed problem. We characterize the optimal policy and value function for this relaxed problem and relate the results to the original optimization problem. Note that for both problems the optimal policy for a given (U_h, U_l) is independent of ϕ as ϕ appears in the objective function additively and does not appear in constraints. Also note that the first best is achieved when $U \in \underline{V}$. So, we focus on the subset $V \setminus \underline{V}$.

1. We want to show that for any U , it is optimal to set p_h, p_l as in (13) and to choose $U(h)$ and $U(l)$ that lie on P_b . It is feasible to choose such a $U(h)$ as the intersection of IC_L and PK_H lies above P_b . It is also feasible to choose such a $U(l)$ as IC_H is dropped. To show that it is optimal to choose $U(h), U(l) \in P_b$, we need to show that $W(U_h, U_l, 1 - \rho_h)$ (or $W(U_h, U_l, \rho_l)$) is weakly increasing in U_h along the rays $x = (1 - \rho_h)U_h + \rho_h U_l$ (or $y = \rho_l U_h + (1 - \rho_l)U_l$). Let \tilde{W} denote the value function from implementing the policy above.
2. Let $(U_{h1}(x), U_{l1}(x))$ be the intersection of P_b and the line $x = (1 - \rho_h)U_h + \rho_h U_l$. We define function $w_h(x) := \tilde{W}(U_{h1}(x), U_{l1}(x), 1 - \rho_h)$ on the domain $[0, (1 - \rho_h)\mu_h + \rho_h \mu_l]$. Similarly, let $(U_{h2}(y), U_{l2}(y))$ be the intersection of P_b and the line $y = \rho_l U_h + (1 - \rho_l)U_l$. We define $w_l(y) := \tilde{W}(U_{h2}(y), U_{l2}(y), \rho_l)$ on the domain $[0, \rho_l \mu_h + (1 - \rho_l)\mu_l]$. For any U , let $X(U) = (1 - \rho_h)U_h + \rho_h U_l$ and $Y(U) = \rho_l U_h + (1 - \rho_l)U_l$. We want to show that (i) $w_h(x)$ (or $w_l(y)$) is concave in x (or y); (ii) w'_h, w'_l is bounded from below by $1 - c/l$ (derivatives have to be understood as either right- or left-derivatives, depending on the inequality); and (iii) for any U on P_b

$$w'_h(X(U)) \geq w'_l(Y(U)). \tag{18}$$

Note that we have $w'_h(X(U)) = w'_l(Y(U)) = 1 - c/h$ when $U \in \bar{V}$. For any fixed $U \in P_b \setminus (\bar{V} \cup V_h)$, a high report leads to $U(h)$ such that $(1 - \rho_h)U_h(h) + \rho_h U_l(h) = (U_h - (1 - \delta)h)/\delta$ and $U(h)$ is lower than U . Also, a low report leads to $U(l)$ such that $\rho_l U_h(l) + (1 - \rho_l)U_l(l) = U_l/\delta$ and $U(l)$ is higher than U if $U \in P_b \setminus (\bar{V} \cup V_h)$. Given the

definition of w_h, w_l , we have

$$\begin{aligned} w'_h(x) &= (1 - \rho_h)U'_{h1}(x)w'_h\left(\frac{U_{h1}(x) - (1 - \delta)h}{\delta}\right) + \rho_h U'_{l1}(x)w'_l\left(\frac{U_{l1}(x)}{\delta}\right), \\ w'_l(y) &= \rho_l U'_{h2}(y)w'_h\left(\frac{U_{h2}(y) - (1 - \delta)h}{\delta}\right) + (1 - \rho_l)U'_{l2}(y)w'_l\left(\frac{U_{l2}(y)}{\delta}\right). \end{aligned}$$

If x, y are given by $X(U), Y(U)$, it follows that $(U_{h1}(x), U_{l1}(y)) = (U_{h2}(y), U_{l2}(y))$ and hence

$$\begin{aligned} w'_h\left(\frac{U_{h1}(x) - (1 - \delta)h}{\delta}\right) &= w'_h\left(\frac{U_{h2}(y) - (1 - \delta)h}{\delta}\right), \\ w'_l\left(\frac{U_{l1}(x)}{\delta}\right) &= w'_l\left(\frac{U_{l2}(y)}{\delta}\right). \end{aligned}$$

Next, we want to show that for any $U \in P_b$ and $x = X(U), y = Y(U)$

$$\begin{aligned} (1 - \rho_h)U'_{h1}(x) + \rho_h U'_{l1}(x) &= \rho_l U'_{h2}(y) + (1 - \rho_l)U'_{l2}(y) = 1, \\ (1 - \rho_h)U'_{h1}(x) - \rho_l U'_{h2}(y) &\geq 0. \end{aligned}$$

This can be shown by assuming that U is on the line segment $U_h = aU_l + b$. For any $a > 0$, the equalities/inequality above hold. The concavity of w_h, w_l can be shown by taking the second derivative

$$\begin{aligned} w''_h(x) &= (1 - \rho_h)U'_{h1}(x)w''_h\left(\frac{U_{h1}(x) - (1 - \delta)h}{\delta}\right)\frac{U'_{h1}(x)}{\delta} + \rho_h U'_{l1}(x)w''_l\left(\frac{U_{l1}(x)}{\delta}\right)\frac{U'_{l1}(x)}{\delta}, \\ w''_l(y) &= \rho_l U'_{h2}(y)w''_h\left(\frac{U_{h2}(y) - (1 - \delta)h}{\delta}\right)\frac{U'_{h2}(y)}{\delta} + (1 - \rho_l)U'_{l2}(y)w''_l\left(\frac{U_{l2}(y)}{\delta}\right)\frac{U'_{l2}(y)}{\delta}. \end{aligned}$$

Here, we use the fact that $U_{h1}(x), U_{l1}(x)$ (or $U_{h2}(y), U_{l2}(y)$) are piece-wise linear in x (or y). For any fixed $U \in P_b \cap V_h$ and $x = X(U), y = Y(U)$, we have

$$\begin{aligned} w'_h(x) &= (1 - \rho_h)U'_{h1}(x)w'_h\left(\frac{U_{h1}(x) - (1 - \delta)h}{\delta}\right) + \rho_h U'_{l1}(x)\frac{l - c}{l}, \\ w'_l(y) &= \rho_l U'_{h2}(y)w'_h\left(\frac{U_{h2}(y) - (1 - \delta)h}{\delta}\right) + (1 - \rho_l)U'_{l2}(y)\frac{l - c}{l}. \end{aligned}$$

Inequality (18) and the concavity of w_h, w_l can be shown similarly. To sum up, if w_h, w_l satisfy properties (i), (ii) and (iii), they also do after one iteration.

3. Let \mathcal{W} be the set of $W(U_h, U_l, 1 - \rho_h)$ and $W(U_h, U_l, \rho_l)$ such that

- (a) $W(U_h, U_l, 1 - \rho_h)$ (or $W(U_h, U_l, \rho_l)$) is weakly increasing in U_h along the rays $x = (1 - \rho_h)U_h + \rho_h U_l$ (or $y = \rho_l U_h + (1 - \rho_l)U_l$);
- (b) $W(U_h, U_l, 1 - \rho_h)$ and $W(U_h, U_l, \rho_l)$ coincide with \tilde{W} on P_b .
- (c) $W(U_h, U_l, 1 - \rho_h)$ and $W(U_h, U_l, \rho_l)$ coincide with \bar{W} on \bar{V} ;

If we pick $W_0(U_h, U_l, \phi) \in \mathcal{W}$ as the continuation value function, the conjectured policy is optimal. It is optimal to choose p_h, p_l according to (13) because w'_h, w'_l are in $[1 - c/l, 1 - c/h]$. We want to show that the new value function W_1 is also in \mathcal{W} . Property (b) and (c) are obvious. We need to prove property (a) for $\phi \in \{1 - \rho_h, \rho_l\}$. That is,

$$W_1(U_h + \varepsilon, U_l, \phi) - W_1(U_h, U_l, \phi) \geq W_1\left(U_h, U_l + \frac{1 - \rho_h}{\rho_h} \varepsilon, \phi\right) - W_1(U_h, U_l, \phi). \quad (19)$$

We start with the case in which $\phi = 1 - \rho_h$. The left-hand side equals

$$\delta(1 - \rho_h) \left(W_0(\tilde{U}_h(h), \tilde{U}_l(h), 1 - \rho_h) - W_0(U_h(h), U_l(h), 1 - \rho_h) \right), \quad (20)$$

where $\tilde{U}(h)$ and $U(h)$ are on P_b and

$$\begin{aligned} (1 - \delta)h + \delta \left((1 - \rho_h)\tilde{U}_h(h) + \rho_h \tilde{U}_l(h) \right) &= U_h + \varepsilon, \\ (1 - \delta)h + \delta \left((1 - \rho_h)U_h(h) + \rho_h U_l(h) \right) &= U_h. \end{aligned}$$

For any fixed $U \in V \setminus (\bar{V} \cup V_h)$, the right-hand side equals

$$\delta \rho_h \left(W_0(\tilde{U}_h(l), \tilde{U}_l(l), \rho_l) - W_0(U_h(l), U_l(l), \rho_l) \right), \quad (21)$$

where $\tilde{U}(l)$ and $U(l)$ are on P_b and

$$\begin{aligned} \delta \left(\rho_l \tilde{U}_h(l) + (1 - \rho_l)\tilde{U}_l(l) \right) &= U_l + \frac{1 - \rho_h}{\rho_h} \varepsilon, \\ \delta \left(\rho_l U_h(l) + (1 - \rho_l)U_l(l) \right) &= U_l. \end{aligned}$$

We need to show that (20) is greater than (21). Note that $U(h), \tilde{U}(h), U(l), \tilde{U}(l)$ are on P_b , so only the properties of w_h, w_l are needed. Taking the limit as ε goes to 0, we obtain that (19) is equivalent to

$$w'_h \left(\frac{U_h - (1 - \delta)h}{\delta} \right) \geq w'_l \left(\frac{U_l}{\delta} \right), \quad \forall (U_h, U_l) \in V \setminus (\bar{V} \cup V_h \cup V_l). \quad (22)$$

The case in which $\phi = \rho_l$ leads to the same inequality as above. Given that w_h, w_l are concave, w'_h, w'_l are decreasing. Therefore, we only need to show that inequality

(22) holds when (U_h, U_l) are on P_b . This is true given that (i) w_h, w_l are concave; (ii) inequality (18) holds; (iii) $(U_h - (1 - \delta)h)/\delta$ corresponds to a lower point on P_b than U_l/δ does. When $U \in V_h$, the right-hand side of (19) is given by $(1 - \rho_h)\varepsilon(1 - c/l)$. Inequality (19) is equivalent to $w'_h((U_h - (1 - \delta)h)/\delta) \geq 1 - c/l$, which is obviously true. Similar analysis applies to the case in which $U \in V_l$.

This shows that the optimal policy for the relaxed problem is the conjectured policy and \tilde{W} is the value function. The maximum is achieved on P_b and the continuation utility never leaves P_b .

We are back to the original optimization problem. The first observation is that we can decompose the optimization problem into two sub-problems: (i) choose $p_h, U(h)$ to maximize $(1 - \delta)p_h(h - c) + \delta W(U_h(h), U_l(h), 1 - \rho_h)$ subject to PK_H and IC_L ; (ii) choose $p_l, U(l)$ to maximize $(1 - \delta)p_l(l - c) + \delta W(U_h(l), U_l(l), \rho_l)$ subject to PK_L and IC_H . We want to show that the conjecture policy with respect to $p_h, U(h)$ is the optimal solution to the first sub-problem. This can be shown by taken the value function \tilde{W} as the continuation value function. We know that the conjecture policy is optimal given \tilde{W} because (i) it is always optimal to choose $U(h)$ that lies on P_b due to property (a); (ii) it is optimal to set p_h to be 1 because w'_h lies in $[1 - c/l, 1 - c/h]$. The conjecture policy solves the first sub-problem because (i) \tilde{W} is weakly higher than the true value function point-wise; (ii) \tilde{W} coincides with the true value function on P_b . The analysis above also implies that IC_H binds for $U \in V_l$. Substituting the agent's expected value in each round into (12), we obtain that

$$\begin{aligned}\hat{u}_h^\nu &= \mu_h - (1 - \delta)h - \delta^{\nu+1} \left((1 - q)l + qh + (1 - q)\kappa^{\nu+1}(\mu_h - \mu_l) \right), \\ \hat{u}_l^\nu &= \mu_l - (1 - \delta)l - \delta^{\nu+1} \left((1 - q)l + qh - q\kappa^{\nu+1}(\mu_h - \mu_l) \right).\end{aligned}$$

It is easily verified that for $U \in V_t$ if we choose p_l to be 0 and $U(l)$ to be on P_b , IC_H binds. Next, we show that the conjecture policy is the solution to the second sub-problem.

For a fixed $U \in V_t$, PK_L and IC_H determines $U_h(l), U_l(l)$ as a function of p_l . Let γ_h, γ_l denote the derivative of $U_h(l), U_l(l)$ with respect to p_l

$$\gamma_h = \frac{(1 - \delta)(l\rho_h - h(1 - \rho_l))}{\delta(1 - \rho_h - \rho_l)}, \quad \gamma_l = \frac{(1 - \delta)(h\rho_l - l(1 - \rho_h))}{\delta(1 - \rho_h - \rho_l)}.$$

It is easy to verify that $\gamma_h < 0$ and $\gamma_h + \gamma_l < 0$. We want to show that it is optimal to set p_l to be zero. That is, among all feasible $p_l, U_h(l), U_l(l)$ satisfying PK_L and IC_H , the principal's payoff from the low type, $(1 - \delta)p_l(l - c) + \delta W(U_h(l), U_l(l), \rho_l)$, is the highest when $p_l = 0$. It is sufficient to show that within the feasible set

$$\gamma_h \frac{\partial W(U_h, U_l, \rho_l)}{\partial U_h} + \gamma_l \frac{\partial W(U_h, U_l, \rho_l)}{\partial U_l} \leq \frac{(1 - \delta)(c - l)}{\delta}, \quad (23)$$

where the left-hand side is the directional derivative of $W(U_h, U_l, \rho_l)$ along the vector (γ_h, γ_l) . We first show that (23) holds for all $U \in V_b$. For any fixed $U \in V_b$, we have

$$W(U_h, U_l, \rho_l) = \rho_l \left((1 - \delta)(h - c) + \delta w_h \left(\frac{U_h - (1 - \delta)h}{\delta} \right) \right) + (1 - \rho_l) \delta w_l \left(\frac{U_l}{\delta} \right).$$

It is easy to verify that $\partial W / \partial U_h = \rho_l w'_h$ and $\partial W / \partial U_l = (1 - \rho_l) w'_l$. Using the fact that $w'_h \geq w'_l$ and $w'_h, w'_l \in [1 - c/l, 1 - c/h]$, we prove that (23) follows. Using similar arguments, we can show that (23) holds for all $U \in V_h$. Note that $W(U_h, U_l, \rho_l)$ is concave on V . Therefore, its directional derivative along the vector (γ_h, γ_l) is monotone. For any fixed (U_h, U_l) on P_b , we have

$$\begin{aligned} & \lim_{\varepsilon \rightarrow 0} \frac{\gamma_h \frac{\partial W(U_h + \gamma_h \varepsilon, U_l + \gamma_l \varepsilon, \rho_l)}{\partial U_h} + \gamma_l \frac{\partial W(U_h + \gamma_h \varepsilon, U_l + \gamma_l \varepsilon, \rho_l)}{\partial U_l} - \left(\gamma_h \frac{\partial W(U_h, U_l, \rho_l)}{\partial U_h} + \gamma_l \frac{\partial W(U_h, U_l, \rho_l)}{\partial U_l} \right)}{\varepsilon} \\ &= \gamma_h^2 \frac{\rho_l}{\delta} w''_h \left(\frac{U_h - (1 - \delta)h}{\delta} \right) + \gamma_l^2 \frac{1 - \rho_l}{\delta} w''_l \left(\frac{U_l}{\delta} \right) \leq 0. \end{aligned}$$

The last inequality follows as w_h, w_l are concave. Given that (γ_h, γ_l) points towards the interior of V , (23) holds within V .

For any $x \in [0, (1 - \rho_h)\mu_h + \rho_h\mu_l]$, let $z(x)$ be $\rho_l U_{h1}(x) + (1 - \rho_l)U_{l1}(x)$. The function $z(x)$ is piecewise linear with z' being positive and increasing in x . Let ϕ_0 denote the prior belief of the high type. We want to show that the maximum of $\phi_0 W(U_h, U_l, 1 - \rho_h) + (1 - \phi_0)W(U_h, U_l, \rho_l)$ is achieved on P_b for any prior ϕ_0 . Suppose not. Suppose $(\tilde{U}_h, \tilde{U}_l) \in V \setminus P_b$ achieves the maximum. Let U^0 (or U^1) denote the intersection of P_b and $(1 - \rho_h)U_h + \rho_h U_l = (1 - \rho_h)\tilde{U}_h + \rho_h \tilde{U}_l$ (or $\rho_l U_h + (1 - \rho_l)U_l = \rho_l \tilde{U}_h + (1 - \rho_l)\tilde{U}_l$). It is easily verified that $U^0 < U^1$. Given that $(\tilde{U}_h, \tilde{U}_l)$ achieves the maximum, it must be true that

$$\begin{aligned} W(U_h^1, U_l^1, 1 - \rho_h) - W(U_h^0, U_l^0, 1 - \rho_h) &< 0, \\ W(U_h^1, U_l^1, \rho_l) - W(U_h^0, U_l^0, \rho_l) &> 0. \end{aligned}$$

We show that this is impossible by arguing that for any $U^0, U^1 \in P_b$ and $U^0 < U^1$, $W(U_h^1, U_l^1, 1 - \rho_h) - W(U_h^0, U_l^0, 1 - \rho_h) < 0$ implies that $W(U_h^1, U_l^1, \rho_l) - W(U_h^0, U_l^0, \rho_l) < 0$. It is without loss to assume that U^0, U^1 are on the same line segment $U_h = aU_l + b$. Hence,

$$\begin{aligned} W(U_h^1, U_l^1, 1 - \rho_h) - W(U_h^0, U_l^0, 1 - \rho_h) &= \int_{s^0}^{s^1} w'_h(s) ds, \\ W(U_h^1, U_l^1, \rho_l) - W(U_h^0, U_l^0, \rho_l) &= z'(s) \int_{s^0}^{s^1} w'_l(z(s)) ds, \end{aligned}$$

where $s^0 = (1 - \rho_h)U_h^0 + \rho_h U_l^0$, $s^1 = (1 - \rho_h)U_h^1 + \rho_h U_l^1$. Given that $w'_h(s) \geq w'_l(z(s))$ and $z'(s) > 0$, $\int_{s^0}^{s^1} w'_h(s)ds < 0$ implies $z'(s) \int_{s^0}^{s^1} w'_l(z(s))ds < 0$. The optimal U_0 is chosen such that $X(U_0)$ maximizes $\phi_0 w_h(x) + (1 - \phi_0)w_l(z(x))$ which is concave in x . Thus, at $x = X(U_0)$,

$$\phi_0 w'_h(X(U_0)) + (1 - \phi_0)w'_l(z(X(U_0)))z'(X(U_0)) = 0.$$

According to (18), we know that $w'_h(X(U_0)) \geq 0 \geq w'_l(z(X(U_0)))$. Therefore, the derivative above is weakly positive for any $\phi'_0 > \phi_0$ and hence U_0 increases in ϕ_0 . ■

C Online Appendix: Not for Publication

C.1 Proof of Lemma 4

Proof. We first consider the forecaster. We will rely on Lemma 8 from the continuous-time (Markovian) version of the game defined in Section 5.1. Specifically, consider a continuous-time model in which random shocks arrive according to a Poisson process at rate λ . Conditional on a shock, the agent's value is h with probability q and l with the complementary probability. Both the shocks' arrivals and the realized values are the agent's private information. This is the same model as in Section 5.1 where $\lambda_h = \lambda(1 - q)$, $\lambda_l = \lambda q$. The principal's payoff W is the same as in Proposition 2. Let W^* denote the principal's payoff if the shocks' arrival times are *publicly* observed. Since the principal benefits from more information, his payoff weakly increases $W^* \geq W$. (The principal is guaranteed W by implementing the continuous-time limit of the policy specified in Theorem 2.) Given risk neutrality, the model with random public arrivals is the same as the model in which shocks arrive at fixed intervals, $t = 1/\lambda, 2/\lambda, 3/\lambda, \dots$. This is effectively the discrete-time model with i.i.d. values in which the round length is $\Delta = 1/\lambda$ and the discount factor is $\delta = e^{-\frac{r}{\lambda}}$. Given that the loss is of the order $\mathcal{O}(r/\lambda)$ in the continuous-time private-shock model, the loss in the discrete-time i.i.d. model is of smaller order than $\mathcal{O}(1 - \delta)$.

Basing on the analysis above, we next show that the loss is of order $\mathcal{O}(1 - \delta)$. We consider an allocation problem in which the agent's first-round type realization is private information whereas his type realization after the first round is public information. Let W^{**} denote the principal's payoff in this problem, which is larger than the principal's payoff in the benchmark model. Let U denote the promised utility before the first round and U_l, U_h the promised utilities after the agent reports l, h during round one. It is optimal to set $p_h = 1, p_l = 0$ during round one. From PK and binding IC_L , we obtain

$$U_h = \frac{(\delta - 1)(qh - ql + l) + U}{\delta}, \quad U_l = \frac{(\delta - 1)q(h - l) + U}{\delta}.$$

The principal's payoff given U is

$$(1 - \delta)q(h - c) + \delta (q\bar{W}(U_h) + (1 - q)\bar{W}(U_l)), \quad (24)$$

where \bar{W} is the complete-information payoff function defined in Lemma 1. The principal's payoff W^{**} is the maximum of (24) over U . It is easy to verify that the efficiency loss $q(h - c) - W^{**}$ is proportional to $(1 - \delta)$. Therefore, the loss in the benchmark model has the order of $\mathcal{O}(1 - \delta)$.

We now consider the prophet. We divide the analysis in three stages. In the first two, we consider a fixed horizon $2N + 1$ and no discounting, as is usual. Let us start with the simplest case: a fixed number of copies $2N + 1$, and $q = 1/2$.⁴³ Suppose that we relax the problem (so as to get a lower bound on the inefficiency). The number $m = 0, \dots, 2N + 1$, of high copies is drawn, and the information set $\{(m, 2N + 1 - m), (2N + 1 - m, m)\}$ is publicly revealed. That is, it is disclosed whether there are m high copies, or $N - m$ high copies (but nothing else).

The optimal mechanism consists of the collection of optimal mechanisms for each information set. We note that, because $q = 1/2$, both elements in the information set are equally likely. Hence, fixing $\{(m, 2N + 1 - m), (2N + 1 - m, m)\}$, with $m < N$, it must minimize the inefficiency

$$\min_{p_0, p_1, p_2} (1 - p_0)m(h - c) + (2N + 1 - 2m)\frac{(1 - p_1)(h - c) + p_1(c - l)}{2} + p_2m(c - l),$$

where p_0, p_1, p_2 are in $[0, 1]$. To understand this expression, we note that it is common knowledge that at least m units are high (hence, providing them with probability p_0 reduces the inefficiency $m(h - c)$ from these. It is also known that m are low, which if provided (with probability p_2) leads to inefficiency $m(c - l)$ and finally there are $2N + 1 - 2m$ units that are either high or low, and the choice p_1 in this respect implies one or the other inefficiency. This program is already simplified, as p_0, p_1, p_2 should be a function of the report (whether the state is $(m, 2N + 1 - m)$ or $(2N + 1 - m, m)$) subject to incentive-compatibility, but it is straightforward that both IC constraints bind and lead to the same choice of p_0, p_1, p_2 for both messages. In fact, it is also clear that $p_0 = 1$ and $p_2 = 0$, so for each information set, the optimal choice is given by the minimizer of

$$(2N + 1 - 2m)\frac{(1 - p_1)(h - c) + p_1(c - l)}{2} \geq (2N + 1 - 2m)\kappa,$$

where $\kappa = \min\{h - c, c - l\}$. Hence, the inefficiency is minimized by (adding up over all information sets)

$$\sum_{m=0}^N \binom{2N + 1}{m} \left(\frac{1}{2}\right)^{2N+1} (2N + 1 - 2m)\kappa = \frac{\Gamma(N + \frac{3}{2})}{\sqrt{\pi}\Gamma(N + 1)}\kappa \rightarrow \frac{\sqrt{2N + 1}}{\sqrt{2\pi}}\kappa.$$

We now move on to the case where $q \neq 1/2$. Without loss of generality, assume $q > 1/2$. Consider the following public disclosure rule. Given the realized draw of high and lows, for

⁴³We pick the number of copies as odd for simplicity. If not, let Nature reveal the event that all copies are high if this unlikely event occurs. This gives as lower bound for the inefficiency with $2N + 2$ copies the one we derive with $2N + 1$.

any high copy, Nature publicly reveals it with probability $\lambda = 2 - 1/q$. Low copies are not revealed. Hence, if a copy is not revealed, the principal's posterior belief that it is high is

$$\frac{q(1-\lambda)}{q(1-\lambda) + (1-q)} = \frac{1}{2}.$$

Second, Nature reveals among the undisclosed balls (say, N' of those) whether the number of highs is m or $N' - m$, namely it discloses the information set $\{(m, N' - m), (N' - m, m)\}$, as before. Then the agent makes a report, etc. Conditional on all publicly revealed information, and given that both states are equally likely, the principal's optimal rule is again to pick a probability p_1 that minimizes

$$(N' - 2m) \frac{(1-p_1)(h-c) + p_1(c-l)}{2} \geq (N' - 2m)\kappa.$$

Hence, the total inefficiency is

$$\sum_{m=0}^{2N+1} \binom{2N+1}{m} q^m (1-q)^{2N+1-m} \left(\sum_{k=0}^m \binom{m}{k} \lambda^k (1-\lambda)^{m-k} |2N+1-k-2(m-k)| \right) \kappa,$$

since with k balls revealed, $N' = 2N + 1 - k$, and the uncertainty concerns whether there are (indeed) $m - k$ high values or low values. Alternatively, because the number of undisclosed copies is a compound Bernoulli, it is a Bernoulli random variable as well with parameter $q\lambda$, and so we seek to compute

$$\frac{1}{\sqrt{2N+1}} \sum_{m=0}^{2N+1} \binom{2N+1}{m} (q\lambda)^m (1-q\lambda)^{N+1-m} \frac{\Gamma(N-m+\frac{3}{2})}{\sqrt{\pi}\Gamma(N-m+1)} \kappa.$$

We note that

$$\begin{aligned} & \lim_{N \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2N+1}} \sum_{m=0}^{2N+1} \binom{2N+1}{m} (q\lambda)^m (1-q\lambda)^{N+1-m} \frac{\Gamma(N-m+\frac{3}{2})}{\sqrt{\pi}\Gamma(N-m+1)} \\ &= \lim_{N \rightarrow \infty} \sum_{m=0}^{2N+1} \binom{2N+1}{m} (q\lambda)^m (1-q\lambda)^{N+1-m} \frac{\sqrt{2N-1-m}}{2\sqrt{N\pi}} \\ &= \sup_{\alpha > 0} \lim_{N \rightarrow \infty} \sum_{m=0}^{2N+1} \binom{2N+1}{m} (q\lambda)^m (1-q\lambda)^{N+1-m} \frac{\sqrt{2N-1-(2N+1)q\lambda(1+\alpha)}}{2\sqrt{N\pi}} \\ &= \sup_{\alpha > 0} \frac{\sqrt{1-(1+\alpha)q\lambda}}{\sqrt{2\pi}} = \frac{\sqrt{1-q\lambda}}{\sqrt{2\pi}} = \frac{\sqrt{1-q}}{\sqrt{\pi}}, \end{aligned}$$

hence the inefficiency converges to

$$\sqrt{2N+1} \frac{\sqrt{1-q}}{\sqrt{\pi}} \kappa.$$

Third, we consider the case of discounting. Note that, because the principal can always treat items separately, facing a problem with k i.i.d. copies, whose value l, h is scaled by a factor $1/k$ (along with the cost) is worth at least as much as one copy with a weight 1. Hence, if say, $\delta^m = 2\delta^k$, then modifying the discounted problem by replacing the unit with weight δ^m by two i.i.d. units with weight δ^k each makes the principal better off. Hence, we fix some small $\alpha > 0$, and consider N such that $\delta^N = \alpha$, *i.e.*, $N = \ln \alpha / \ln \delta$. The principal's payoff is also increased if the values of all units after the N -th one are revealed for free. Hence, assume as much. Replacing each copy $k = 1, \dots, N$ by $\lfloor \delta^k / \delta^N \rfloor$ i.i.d. copies each with weight δ^N gives us as lower bound to the loss to the principal

$$\sup_{\alpha} \frac{\delta^N}{\sqrt{\sum_{k=1}^N \lfloor \delta^k / \delta^N \rfloor}},$$

and the right-hand side tends to a limit in excess of $\frac{1}{2\sqrt{1-\delta}}$ (use $\alpha = 1/2$ for instance). ■

C.2 Continuous Time

Define the function

$$g(\tau) := q(h - l)e^{-(\lambda_h + \lambda_l)\tau} + le^{r\tau} - \mu,$$

so that upon direct calculation,

$$d\tau_l := \frac{g(\tau)}{\mu - q(h - l)e^{-(\lambda_h + \lambda_l)\tau}} dt,$$

where $\mu = qh + (1 - q)l$, as before. If \underline{V} has a non-empty interior, we can identify the value of τ that is the intersection of the critical line and the boundary; call this value $\hat{\tau}$, which is simply the positive root (if any) of g . Otherwise, set $\hat{\tau} = 0$. Also, recall that $d\tau_h = -1$.

We now motivate the derivation of the differential equations solved by W_h, W_l . By definition of the policy that is followed, the value functions solve the following paired system of equations:

$$W_h(\tau) = rdt(h - c) + \lambda_h dt W_l(\tau) + (1 - rdt - \lambda_h dt) W_h(\tau + d\tau_h) + \mathcal{O}(dt^2),$$

and

$$W_l(\tau) = \lambda_l dt W_h(\tau) + (1 - rdt - \lambda_l dt) W_l(\tau + d\tau_l) + \mathcal{O}(dt^2).$$

Assume for now (as will be verified) that the functions W_h, W_l are twice differentiable. We then obtain the differential equations

$$(r + \lambda_h)W_h(\tau) = r(h - c) + \lambda_h W_l(\tau) - W_h'(\tau),$$

and

$$(r + \lambda_l)W_l(\tau) = \lambda_l W_h(\tau) + \frac{g(\tau)}{\mu - q(h-l)e^{-(\lambda_h + \lambda_l)\tau}} W_l'(\tau),$$

subject to the following boundary conditions.⁴⁴ First, at $\tau = \hat{\tau}$, the value must coincide with the value given by the first-best payoff \bar{W} in that range. That is, $W_h(\hat{\tau}) = \bar{W}_h(\hat{\tau})$, and $W_l(\hat{\tau}) = \bar{W}_l(\hat{\tau})$. Second, as $\tau \rightarrow \infty$, it must hold that the payoff $\mu - c$ is approached. Hence,

$$\lim_{\tau \rightarrow \infty} W_h(\tau) = \mu_h - c, \quad \lim_{\tau \rightarrow \infty} W_l(\tau) = \mu_l - c.$$

We directly work with the expected payoff $W(\tau) = qW_h(\tau) + (1-q)W_l(\tau)$. Let τ_0 denote the positive root of

$$w_0(\tau) := \mu e^{-r\tau} - (1-q)l.$$

As is easy to see, this root always exists and is strictly above $\hat{\tau}$, with $w_0(\tau) > 0$ iff $\tau < \hat{\tau}$. Finally, let

$$f(\tau) := r - (\lambda_h + \lambda_l) \frac{w_0(\tau)}{g(\tau)} e^{r\tau}.$$

It is then straightforward to verify (though not quite as easy to obtain) that⁴⁵

Proposition 2 *The value function of the principal is given by*

$$W(\tau) = \begin{cases} \bar{W}_1(\tau) & \text{if } \tau \in [0, \hat{\tau}), \\ \bar{W}_1(\tau) - w_0(\tau) \frac{h-l}{hl} c r \mu \frac{\int_{\hat{\tau}}^{\tau} \frac{e^{-\int_{\tau_0}^t f(s) ds}}{w_0^2(t)} dt}{\int_{\hat{\tau}}^{\infty} \frac{\lambda_h + \lambda_l}{g(t)} e^{2rt - \int_{\tau_0}^t f(s) ds} dt} & \text{if } \tau \in [\hat{\tau}, \tau_0), \\ \bar{W}_1(\tau) + w_0(\tau) \frac{h-l}{hl} c \left(1 + r \mu \frac{\int_{\tau}^{\infty} \frac{e^{-\int_{\tau_0}^t f(s) ds}}{w_0^2(t)} dt}{\int_{\hat{\tau}}^{\infty} \frac{\lambda_h + \lambda_l}{g(t)} e^{2rt - \int_{\tau_0}^t f(s) ds} dt} \right) & \text{if } \tau \geq \tau_0, \end{cases}$$

where

$$\bar{W}_1(\tau) := (1 - e^{-r\tau})(1 - c/h)\mu.$$

It is straightforward to derive the closed-form expressions for complete-information payoff, which we omit here.

⁴⁴To be clear, these are not HJB equations, as there is no need to verify the optimality of the policy that is being followed. This fact has already been established. The functions must satisfy these simple recursive equations.

⁴⁵As $\tau \rightarrow t_0$, the integrals entering in the definition of W diverge, although not W itself, given that $\lim_{\tau \rightarrow t_0} w_0(\tau) \rightarrow 0$. As a result, $\lim_{\tau \rightarrow t_0} W(\tau)$ is well-defined, and strictly below $W_1(t_0)$.

Proof of Lemma 7. The proof has three steps. We recall that $W(\tau) = qW_h(\tau) + (1 - q)W_l(\tau)$. Using the system of differential equations, we get

$$\begin{aligned} & (e^{r\tau}l + q(h-l)e^{-(\lambda_h+\lambda_l)\tau} - \mu) ((r + \lambda_h)W'(\tau) + W''(\tau)), \\ & = (h-l)q\lambda_h e^{-(\lambda_h+\lambda_l)\tau}W'(\tau) + \mu(r(\lambda_h + \lambda_l)W(\tau) + \lambda_l W'(\tau) - r\lambda_l(h-c)). \end{aligned}$$

It is easily verified that the function W given in Proposition 2 solves this differential equation, and hence is the solution to our problem. Let $w := W - \bar{W}_1$. By definition, w solves a homogeneous second-order differential equation, namely,

$$k(\tau)(w''(\tau) + rw'(\tau)) = r\mu w(\tau) + e^{r\tau}w_0(\tau)w'(\tau), \quad (25)$$

with boundary conditions $w(\hat{\tau}) = 0$ and $\lim_{\tau \rightarrow \infty} w(\tau) = -(1 - l/h)(1 - q)c$. Here,

$$k(\tau) := \frac{q(h-l)e^{-(\lambda_h+\lambda_l)\tau} + le^{r\tau} - \mu}{\lambda_h + \lambda_l}.$$

By definition of $\hat{\tau}$, $k(\tau) > 0$ for $\tau > \hat{\tau}$. First, we show that k increases with persistence $1/p$, where $\lambda_h = p\bar{\lambda}_h$, $\lambda_l = p\bar{\lambda}_l$, for some $\bar{\lambda}_h, \bar{\lambda}_l$ fixed independently of $p > 0$. Second, we show that $r\mu w(\tau) + e^{r\tau}w_0(\tau)w'(\tau) < 0$, and so $w''(\tau) + rw'(\tau) < 0$ (see (25)). Finally we use these two facts to show that the payoff function is pointwise increasing in p . We give the arguments for the case $\hat{\tau} = 0$, the other case being analogous.

1. Differentiating k with respect to p (and without loss setting $p = 1$) gives

$$\frac{dk(\tau)}{dp} = \frac{\mu}{\bar{\lambda}_h + \bar{\lambda}_l} - \frac{e^{-(\bar{\lambda}_h+\bar{\lambda}_l)\tau}(h-l)\bar{\lambda}_l(1 + \underline{(\bar{\lambda}_l + \bar{\lambda}_h)})}{(\bar{\lambda}_h + \bar{\lambda}_l)^2} - \frac{l}{\bar{\lambda}_h + \bar{\lambda}_l}e^{r\tau}.$$

Evaluated at $\tau = \hat{\tau}$, this is equal to 0. We majorize this expression by ignoring the term linear in τ (underlined in the expression above). This majorization is still equal to 0 at 0. Taking second derivatives with respect to τ of the majorization shows that it is concave. Finally, its first derivative with respect to τ at 0 is equal to

$$h\frac{\bar{\lambda}_l}{\bar{\lambda}_h + \bar{\lambda}_l} - l\frac{r + \bar{\lambda}_l}{\bar{\lambda}_h + \bar{\lambda}_l} \leq 0,$$

because $r \leq \frac{h-l}{l}\bar{\lambda}_l$ whenever $\hat{\tau} = 0$. This establishes that k is decreasing in p .

2. For this step, we use the explicit formulas for W (or equivalently, w) given in Proposition 2. Computing $r\mu w(\tau) + e^{r\tau}w_0(\tau)w'(\tau)$ over the two intervals $(\hat{\tau}, \tau_0)$ and (τ_0, ∞) yields on both intervals, after simplification,

$$-\frac{\frac{h-l}{hl}c}{\int_{\hat{\tau}}^{\infty} \frac{\bar{\lambda}_h + \bar{\lambda}_l}{rv g(t)} e^{2rt - \int_{\tau_0}^t f(s)ds} dt} e^{r\tau} e^{-\int_{\hat{\tau}}^{\tau} f_s ds} < 0.$$

[The fraction can be checked to be negative. Alternatively, note that $W \leq \bar{W}_1$ on $\tau < \tau_0$ is equivalent to this fraction being negative, yet $\bar{W}_1 \geq \bar{W}$ (\bar{W}_1 is the first branch of the complete-information payoff), and because W solves our problem it has to be less than \bar{W}_1 .]

3. Consider two levels of persistence, p, \tilde{p} , with $\tilde{p} > p$. Write \tilde{w}, w for the corresponding solutions to the differential equation (25), and similarly \tilde{W}, W . Note that $\tilde{W} \geq W$ is equivalent to $\tilde{w} \geq w$, because \bar{W}_1 and w_0 do not depend on p . Suppose that there exists τ such that $\tilde{w}(\tau) < w(\tau)$ yet $\tilde{w}'(\tau) = w'(\tau)$. We then have that the right-hand sides of (25) can be ranked for both persistence levels, at τ . Hence, so must be the left-hand sides. Because $k(\tau)$ is lower for \tilde{p} than for p (by our first step), because $k(\tau)$ is positive and because the terms $w''(\tau) + rw'(\tau)$, $\tilde{w}''(\tau) + r\tilde{w}'(\tau)$ are negative, and finally because $\tilde{w}'(\tau) = w'(\tau)$, it follows that $\tilde{w}''(\tau) \leq w''(\tau)$. Hence, the trajectories of w and \tilde{w} cannot get closer: for any $\tau' > \tau$, $w(\tau) - \tilde{w}(\tau) \leq w(\tau') - \tilde{w}(\tau')$. This is impossible, because both w and \tilde{w} must converge to the same value, $-(1 - l/h)(1 - q)c$, as $\tau \rightarrow \infty$. Hence, we cannot have $\tilde{w}(\tau) < w(\tau)$ yet $\tilde{w}'(\tau) = w'(\tau)$. Note however that this means that $\tilde{w}(\tau) < w(\tau)$ is impossible, because if this were the case, then by the same argument, since their values as $\tau \rightarrow \infty$ are the same, it is necessary (by the intermediate value theorem) that for some τ such that $\tilde{w}(\tau) < w(\tau)$ the slopes are the same.

■

Proof of Lemma 8. The proof is divided into two steps. First we show that the difference in payoffs between $W(\tau)$ and the complete-information payoff computed at the same level of utility $\underline{u}(\tau)$ converges to 0 at a rate linear in r , for all τ . Second, we show that the distance between the closest point on the graph of $\underline{u}(\cdot)$ and the complete-information payoff maximizing pair of utilities converges to 0 at a rate linear in r . Given that the complete-information payoff is piecewise affine in utilities, the result follows from the triangle inequality.

1. We first note that the complete-information payoff along the graph of $\underline{u}(\cdot)$ is at most equal to $\max\{\bar{W}_1(\tau), \bar{W}_2(\tau)\}$, where \bar{W}_1 is defined in Proposition 2 and

$$\bar{W}_2(\tau) = (1 - e^{-r\tau})(1 - c/l)\mu + q(h/l - 1)c.$$

These are simply two of the four affine maps whose lower envelope defines \bar{W} , see Section 3.1 (those for the domains $[0, v_h^*] \times [0, v_l^*]$ and $[0, \mu_h] \times [v_l^*, \mu_l]$). The formulas

obtain by plugging in $\underline{u}_h, \underline{u}_l$ for U_h, U_l , and simplifying. Fix $z = r\tau$ (note that as $r \rightarrow 0$, $\hat{\tau} \rightarrow \infty$, so that changing variables is necessary to compare limiting values as $r \rightarrow 0$), and fix z such that $le^z > \mu$ (that is, such that $g(z/r) > 0$ and hence $z \geq r\hat{\tau}$ for small enough r). Algebra gives

$$\lim_{r \rightarrow 0} f(z/r) = \frac{(e^z - 1)\lambda_h l - \lambda_l h}{le^z - \mu},$$

and similarly

$$\lim_{r \rightarrow 0} w_0(z/r) = (qh - (e^z - 1)(1 - q)l)e^{-z},$$

as well as

$$\lim_{r \rightarrow 0} g(z/r) = le^z - \mu.$$

Hence, fixing z and letting $r \rightarrow 0$ (so that $\tau \rightarrow \infty$), it follows that $\frac{w_0(\tau) \int_{\hat{\tau}}^{\tau} \frac{e^{-\int_{\tau_0}^t f(s) ds}}{w_0^2(t)} dt}{\int_{\hat{\tau}}^{\infty} \frac{\lambda_h + \lambda_l}{g(t)} e^{2rt - \int_{\tau_0}^t f(s) ds} dt}$ converge to a well-defined limit. (Note that the value of τ_0 is irrelevant to this quantity, and we might as well use $r\tau_0 = \ln(\mu/((1 - q)l))$, a quantity independent of r). Denote this limit κ . Hence, for $z < r\tau_0$, because

$$\lim_{r \rightarrow 0} \frac{\bar{W}_1(z/r) - W(z/r)}{r} = \frac{h - l}{hl} c\kappa,$$

it follows that $W(z/r) = \bar{W}_1(z/r) + \mathcal{O}(r)$. On $z > r\tau_0$, it is immediate to check from the formula of Proposition 2 that

$$W(\tau) = \bar{W}_2(\tau) + w_0(\tau) \frac{h - l}{hl} cr\mu \frac{\int_{\hat{\tau}}^{\tau} \frac{e^{-\int_{\tau_0}^t f(s) ds}}{w_0^2(t)} dt}{\int_{\hat{\tau}}^{\infty} \frac{\lambda_h + \lambda_l}{g(t)} e^{2rt - \int_{\tau_0}^t f(s) ds} dt}.$$

[By definition of τ_0 , $w_0(\tau)$ is now negative.] By the same steps it follows that $W(z/r) = \bar{W}_2(z/r) + \mathcal{O}(r)$ on $z > r\tau_0$. Because $W = \bar{W}_1$ for $\tau < \hat{\tau}$, this concludes the first step.

2. For the second step, note that the utility pair maximizing complete-information payoff is given by $v^* = \left(\frac{r + \lambda_l}{r + \lambda_l + \lambda_h} h, \frac{\lambda_l}{r + \lambda_l + \lambda_h} h \right)$. (Take limits from the discrete game.) We evaluate $\underline{u}(\tau) - v^*$ at a particular choice of τ , namely

$$\tau^* = \frac{1}{r} \ln \frac{\mu}{(1 - q)l}.$$

It is immediate to check that

$$\frac{\underline{u}_l(\tau^*) - v_l^*}{qr} = -\frac{\underline{u}_h(\tau^*) - v_h^*}{(1 - q)r} = \frac{l + (h - l) \left(\frac{(1 - q)l}{\mu} \right)^{\frac{r + \lambda_l + \lambda_h}{r}}}{r + \lambda_l + \lambda_h} \rightarrow \frac{l}{\lambda_l + \lambda_h},$$

and so $\|\underline{u}(\tau^*) - v^*\| = \mathcal{O}(r)$. It is also easily verified that this gives an upper bound on the order of the distance between the polygonal chain and the point v^* . This concludes the second step.

■

C.3 Continuous Types

Proof of Theorem 4. By the principle of optimality, letting $S := W - U$,

$$S(U) = \delta \int S(\mathcal{U}(U, v)) dF - (1 - \delta)c\mathbf{E}_F[q(v)],$$

over $q : [\underline{v}, 1] \rightarrow [0, 1]$ and $\mathcal{U} : [0, \mu] \times [\underline{v}, 1] \rightarrow [0, \mu]$, subject to

$$U = \int ((1 - \delta)q(v)v + \delta\mathcal{U}(U, v)) dF,$$

and, for all $v, v' \in [\underline{v}, 1]$,

$$(1 - \delta)q(v)v + \delta\mathcal{U}(U, v) \geq (1 - \delta)q(v')v + \delta\mathcal{U}(U, v').$$

Note that the dependence of q on U is omitted. By the usual arguments, it follows that q is nondecreasing and differentiable a.e., with $(1 - \delta)q'(v)v + \delta\frac{\partial\mathcal{U}(U, v)}{\partial v} = 0$, and so

$$\mathcal{U}(U, v) = \mathcal{U}(U, \underline{v}) - \frac{1 - \delta}{\delta} \left(vq(v) - \underline{v}q(\underline{v}) - \int_{\underline{v}}^v q(s)ds \right).$$

This formula is also correct if q is discontinuous. Promise keeping becomes

$$U = \delta\mathcal{U}(U, \underline{v}) + (1 - \delta) \left(\underline{v}q(\underline{v}) + \int_{\underline{v}}^1 (1 - F(v))q(v)dv \right).$$

So, the objective $S(U)$ equals

$$\sup \left\{ \delta \int S \left(\frac{U}{\delta} - \frac{1 - \delta}{\delta} \left(vq(v) - \int_{\underline{v}}^v q(s)ds - \int_{\underline{v}}^1 (1 - F(v))q(v)ds \right) \right) dF - (1 - \delta)c\mathbf{E}_F[q(v)] \right\},$$

over $q : [\underline{v}, 1] \rightarrow [0, 1]$, nondecreasing, and the feasibility restriction

$$\forall v \in [\underline{v}, 1] : U - (1 - \delta) \left(vq(v) - \int_{\underline{v}}^v q(s)ds - \int_{\underline{v}}^1 (1 - F(v))q(v)ds \right) \in [0, \delta\mu].$$

We note that, by the envelope theorem,

$$S'(U) = \int S'(\mathcal{U}(U, v))dF.$$

We restrict attention to the case in which $q(\underline{v}) = 0$, $q(1) = 1$, slight adjustments might be necessary otherwise.

Again, let us suppose contrary to the assumption that S' is constant over some interval I . Pick two points in this interval, $U_1 < U_2$. Given $U = \lambda U_1 + (1 - \lambda)U_2$, $\lambda \in (0, 1)$, consider the policy $q_\lambda, \mathcal{U}_\lambda$ that uses $q_\lambda = \lambda q_1 + (1 - \lambda)q_2$, and similarly $\mathcal{U}_\lambda(\cdot, v) = \lambda \mathcal{U}_1(\cdot, v) + (1 - \lambda)\mathcal{U}_2(\cdot, v)$. To be clear, this is the strategy that consists, for every report v , in giving the agent the good with probability $q_\lambda(v) = \lambda q_1(v) + (1 - \lambda)q_2(v)$, and transiting to the utility the averages of the utility after v under the policy starting at U_1 and U_2 (more generally, the weighted average given the sequence of reports). We note that, given risk neutrality of the agent, this policy induces the agent to report truthfully (since he does both at U_1 and at U_2), and gives him utility U , by construction.

We claim that, given U , and for any given v , $S'(\mathcal{U}(U_1, v)) = S'(\mathcal{U}(U_2, v))$. If not, then there exists v such that $S'(\mathcal{U}(U_1, v)) \neq S'(\mathcal{U}(U_2, v))$ and some $U' = \lambda \mathcal{U}(U_1, v) + (1 - \lambda)\mathcal{U}(U_2, v)$ in between these two values such that $S(U') > \lambda S(\mathcal{U}(U_1, v)) + (1 - \lambda)S(\mathcal{U}(U_2, v))$. Then, consider using the policy that uses $q_\lambda, \mathcal{U}_\lambda$ for one step and then reverts to the optimal policy. Because it does at least as well as the average of the two policies for all values of v , and does strictly better for v , it is a strict improvement, a contradiction.

Hence, we may assume that $S'(\mathcal{U}(U_1, v)) = S'(\mathcal{U}(U_2, v))$. We next claim that this implies that, without loss, $q_1(\cdot) = q_2(\cdot)$. Indeed, we can divide $[\underline{v}, 1]$ into those (maximum length) intervals over which $S'(\mathcal{U}(U_1, v)) = S'(\mathcal{U}(U_2, v))$ and those over which $S'(\mathcal{U}(U_i, v)) > S'(\mathcal{U}(U_{-i}, v))$, for some $i = 1, 2$. On any interval of values of v over which $\mathcal{U}(U_1, v) = \mathcal{U}(U_2, v)$, it follows from the formula above, namely,

$$\mathcal{U}(U, v) = \mathcal{U}(U, v') - \frac{1 - \delta}{\delta} \int_{v'}^v s dq(s),$$

that the variation is the same for q_1 and q_2 (Since the function $\mathcal{U}(U, v)$ is the same). Over intervals of values of v over which S' is independent of i , S must be affine over the ranges $[\min_i \{\mathcal{U}(U_i, v)\}, \max_i \{\mathcal{U}(U_i, v)\}]$, so that, because S is affine, it follows from the Bellman equation that U does not matter for the optimal choice of q either.

Hence, $q_1(\cdot) = q_2(\cdot)$. It follows that, if for some v , $\mathcal{U}(U_1, v) = \mathcal{U}(U_2, v)$, it must also be that $\mathcal{U}(U_1, \cdot) = \mathcal{U}(U_2, \cdot)$. This is impossible, because then $U_1 = U_2$, by promise-keeping. Hence, there is no v such that $\mathcal{U}(U_1, v) = \mathcal{U}(U_2, v)$, and S is affine on the entire range

of $\mathcal{U}(U_1, \cdot), \mathcal{U}(U_2, \cdot)$. In fact, the values of $\mathcal{U}(U_1, \cdot)$ must be translates of those of $\mathcal{U}(U_2, \cdot)$. Without loss, we might take $[U_1, U_2]$ to be the largest interval over which S is affine. Given that $q(\underline{v}) = 0 < q(1) = 1$, neither $\mathcal{U}(U_1, \cdot)$ nor $\mathcal{U}(U_2, \cdot)$ is degenerate (that is, constant). Therefore, the only possibility is that both the range of $\mathcal{U}(U_1, \cdot)$ and that of $\mathcal{U}(U_2, \cdot)$ are in $[U_1, U_2]$. This is impossible given promise keeping and that $q_1(\cdot) = q_2(\cdot)$. ■

For clarity of exposition, we assume that the agent's value v is drawn from $[\underline{v}, \bar{v}]$ (instead of $[\underline{v}, 1]$) according to F with $\underline{v} \in [0, \bar{v}]$. Let $x_1(v) = p(v)$ and $x_2(v) = \mathcal{U}(U, v)$. The optimal policy x_1, x_2 is the solution to the control problem

$$\max_u \int_{\underline{v}}^{\bar{v}} (1 - \delta)x_1(v)(v - c) + \delta W(x_2(v))dF,$$

subject to the law of motion $x'_1 = u$ and $x'_2 = -(1 - \delta)vu/\delta$. The control is u and the law of motion captures the incentive compatibility constraints. We define a third state variable x_3 to capture the promise-keeping constraint

$$x_3(v) = (1 - \delta)v x_1(v) + \delta x_2(v) + (1 - \delta) \int_{\underline{v}}^{\bar{v}} x_1(s)(1 - F(s))ds.$$

The law of motion of x_3 is $x'_3(v) = (1 - \delta)x_1(v)(F(v) - 1)$.⁴⁶ The constraints are

$$\begin{aligned} u &\geq 0, \\ x_1(\underline{v}) &\geq 0, \quad x_1(\bar{v}) \leq 1, \\ x_2(\underline{v}) &\leq \bar{v}, \quad x_2(\bar{v}) \geq 0, \\ x_3(\underline{v}) &= U, \quad x_3(\bar{v}) - (1 - \delta)\bar{v}x_1(\bar{v}) - \delta x_2(\bar{v}) = 0. \end{aligned}$$

Let $\gamma_1, \gamma_2, \gamma_3$ be the costate variables and μ_0 the multiplier for $u \geq 0$. For the rest of this sub-section the dependence on v is omitted when no confusion arises. The Lagrange is

$$\mathcal{L} = ((1 - \delta)x_1(v - c) + \delta W(x_2))f + \gamma_1 u - \gamma_2 \frac{1 - \delta}{\delta} v u + \gamma_3 (1 - \delta)x_1(F - 1) + \mu_0 u.$$

⁴⁶Note that the promise-keeping constraint can be rewritten as

$$U = (1 - \delta)\underline{v}x_1(\underline{v}) + \delta x_2(\underline{v}) + (1 - \delta) \int_{\underline{v}}^{\bar{v}} x_1(s)(1 - F(s))ds.$$

The first-order conditions are

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial u} &= \gamma_1 - \gamma_2 \frac{1 - \delta}{\delta} v + \mu_0 = 0, \\ \dot{\gamma}_1 &= -\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial x_1} = (1 - \delta) (\gamma_3 (1 - F) - f(v - c)), \\ \dot{\gamma}_2 &= -\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial x_2} = -\delta f W'(x_2), \\ \dot{\gamma}_3 &= -\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial x_3} = 0.\end{aligned}$$

The transversality conditions are

$$\begin{aligned}\gamma_1(\underline{v}) &\leq 0, \quad \gamma_1(\bar{v}) + (1 - \delta)\bar{v}\gamma_3(\bar{v}) \leq 0, \\ \gamma_1(\underline{v})x_1(\underline{v}) &= 0, \quad (\gamma_1(\bar{v}) + (1 - \delta)\bar{v}\gamma_3(\bar{v})) (1 - x_1(\bar{v})) = 0, \\ \gamma_2(\underline{v}) &\geq 0, \quad \gamma_2(\bar{v}) + \delta\gamma_3(\bar{v}) \geq 0, \\ \gamma_2(\underline{v})(\bar{v} - x_2(\underline{v})) &= 0, \quad (\gamma_2(\bar{v}) + \delta\gamma_3(\bar{v}))x_2(\bar{v}) = 0, \\ \gamma_3(\underline{v}) \text{ and } \gamma_3(\bar{v}) &\text{ free.}\end{aligned}$$

The first observation is that $\gamma_3(v)$ is constant, denoted γ_3 . Moreover, given γ_3 , $\dot{\gamma}_1$ involves no endogenous variables. Therefore, for a fixed $\gamma_1(\underline{v})$, the trajectory of γ_1 is fixed. Whenever $u > 0$, we have $\mu_0 = 0$. The first-order condition $\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial u} = 0$ implies that

$$\gamma_2 = \frac{\delta\gamma_1}{(1 - \delta)v} \quad \text{and} \quad \dot{\gamma}_2 = \frac{\delta(\gamma_1 - v\dot{\gamma}_1)}{(\delta - 1)v^2}.$$

Given that $\dot{\gamma}_2 = -\delta f W'(x_2)$, we could determine the state x_2

$$x_2 = (W')^{-1} \left(\frac{v\dot{\gamma}_1 - \gamma_1}{(\delta - 1)fv^2} \right). \quad (26)$$

The control u is given by $-\dot{x}_2\delta/((1 - \delta)v)$. As the promised utility varies, we conjecture that the solution can be one of the three cases.

Case one occurs when U is intermediate: There exists $\underline{v} \leq v_1 \leq v_2 \leq \bar{v}$ such that $x_1 = 0$ for $v \leq v_1$, x_1 is strictly increasing when $v \in (v_1, v_2)$ and $x_1 = 1$ for $v \geq v_2$. Given that $u > 0$ iff $v \in (v_1, v_2)$, we have

$$x_2 = \begin{cases} (W')^{-1} \left(\frac{v\dot{\gamma}_1 - \gamma_1}{(\delta - 1)fv^2} \right) \Big|_{v=v_1} & \text{if } v < v_1, \\ (W')^{-1} \left(\frac{v\dot{\gamma}_1 - \gamma_1}{(\delta - 1)fv^2} \right) & \text{if } v_1 \leq v \leq v_2, \\ (W')^{-1} \left(\frac{v\dot{\gamma}_1 - \gamma_1}{(\delta - 1)fv^2} \right) \Big|_{v=v_2} & \text{if } v > v_2, \end{cases}$$

and

$$x_1 = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } v < v_1, \\ -\frac{\delta}{1-\delta} \int_{v_1}^v \frac{\dot{x}_2}{s} ds & \text{if } v_1 \leq v \leq v_2, \\ 1 & \text{if } v > v_2. \end{cases}$$

The continuity of x_1 at v_2 requires that

$$-\frac{\delta}{1-\delta} \int_{v_1}^{v_2} \frac{\dot{x}_2}{s} ds = 1. \quad (27)$$

The trajectory of γ_2 is given by

$$\gamma_2 = \begin{cases} \frac{\delta\gamma_1}{(1-\delta)v_1} + \delta(F(v_1) - F(v)) \frac{v_1\dot{\gamma}_1(v_1) - \gamma_1(v_1)}{(\delta-1)f(v_1)v_1^2} & \text{if } v < v_1, \\ \frac{\delta\gamma_1}{(1-\delta)v} & \text{if } v_1 \leq v \leq v_2, \\ \frac{\delta\gamma_1}{(1-\delta)v_2} - \delta(F(v) - F(v_2)) \frac{v_2\dot{\gamma}_1(v_2) - \gamma_1(v_2)}{(\delta-1)f(v_2)v_2^2} & \text{if } v > v_2. \end{cases}$$

If $(W')^{-1} \left(\frac{v_1\dot{\gamma}_1(v_1) - \gamma_1(v_1)}{(\delta-1)f(v_1)v_1^2} \right) < \bar{v}$ and $(W')^{-1} \left(\frac{v_2\dot{\gamma}_1(v_2) - \gamma_1(v_2)}{(\delta-1)f(v_2)v_2^2} \right) > 0$, the transversality condition requires that

$$\frac{\delta\gamma_1(v_1)}{(1-\delta)v_1} + \delta F(v_1) \frac{v_1\dot{\gamma}_1(v_1) - \gamma_1(v_1)}{(\delta-1)f(v_1)v_1^2} = 0, \quad (28)$$

$$\frac{\delta\gamma_1(v_2)}{(1-\delta)v_2} - \delta(1 - F(v_2)) \frac{v_2\dot{\gamma}_1(v_2) - \gamma_1(v_2)}{(\delta-1)f(v_2)v_2^2} = -\delta\gamma_3. \quad (29)$$

We have four unknowns $v_1, v_2, \gamma_3, \gamma_1(\bar{v})$ and four equations, (27)–(29) and the promise-keeping constraint. Alternatively, for a fixed v_1 , (27)–(29) determine the three other unknowns $v_2, \gamma_3, \gamma_1(\bar{v})$. We need to verify that all inequality constraints are satisfied.

Case two occurs when U is close to 0: There exists v_1 such that $x_1 = 0$ for $v \leq v_1$ and x_1 is strictly increasing when $v \in (v_1, \bar{v}]$. The $x_1(\bar{v}) \leq 1$ constraint does not bind. This implies that $\gamma_1(\bar{v}) + (1-\delta)\bar{v}\gamma_3 = 0$. When $v > v_1$, the state x_2 is pinned down by (26).

From the condition that $\gamma_1(\bar{v}) + (1-\delta)\bar{v}\gamma_3(\bar{v}) = 0$, we have that $W'(x_2(\bar{v})) = 1 - c/\bar{v}$. Given strict concavity of W and $W'(0) = 1 - c/\bar{v}$, we have $x_2(\bar{v}) = 0$. The constraint $x_2(\bar{v}) \geq 0$ binds, so (29) is replaced with

$$\frac{\delta\gamma_1(\bar{v})}{(1-\delta)\bar{v}} + \delta\gamma_3 \leq 0,$$

which is always satisfied given that $\gamma_1(\bar{v}) \leq 0$. From (28), we can solve γ_3 in terms of v_1 . Lastly, the promise-keeping constraint pins down the value of v_1 . Note that the constraint

$x_1(\bar{v}) \leq 1$ does not bind. This requires that

$$-\frac{\delta}{1-\delta} \int_{v_1}^{\bar{v}} \frac{\dot{x}_2}{s} ds \leq 1. \quad (30)$$

There exists a v_1^* such that this inequality is satisfied if and only if $v_1 \geq v_1^*$. When $v_1 < v_1^*$, we move to case one. We would like to prove that the left-hand side increases as v_1 decreases. Note that γ_3 measures the marginal benefit of U , so it equals $W'(U)$.

Case three occurs when $\underline{v} > 0$ and U is close to μ : There exists v_2 such that $x_1 = 1$ for $v \geq v_2$ and x_2 is strictly increasing when $v \in [\underline{v}, v_2)$. The $x_1(\underline{v}) \geq 0$ constraint does not bind. This implies that $\gamma_1(\underline{v}) = 0$. When $v < v_2$, the state x_2 is pinned down by (26). From the condition that $\gamma_1(\underline{v}) = 0$, we have that $W'(x_2(\underline{v})) = 1 - c/\underline{v}$. Given strict concavity of W and $W'(\bar{v}) = 1 - c/\bar{v}$, we have $x_2(\underline{v}) = \bar{v}$. The constraint $x_2(\underline{v}) \leq 1$ binds, so (28) is replaced with

$$\frac{\delta \gamma_1(\underline{v})}{(1-\delta)\underline{v}} \leq 0,$$

which is always satisfied given that $\gamma_1(\underline{v}) \leq 0$. From (29), we can solve γ_3 in terms of v_2 . Lastly, the promise-keeping constraint pins down the value of v_2 . Note that the constraint $x_1(\underline{v}) \geq 0$ does not bind. This requires that

$$-\frac{\delta}{1-\delta} \int_{\underline{v}}^{v_2} \frac{\dot{x}_2}{s} ds \leq 1. \quad (31)$$

There exists a v_2^* such that this inequality is satisfied if and only if $v_2 \leq v_2^*$. When $v_2 > v_2^*$, we move to case one.

Proof of Proposition 1. To illustrate, we assume that v is uniform on $[0, 1]$. The proof for $F(v) = v^a$ with $a > 1$ is similar. We start with case two. From condition (28), we solve for $\gamma_3 = 1 + c(v_1 - 2)$. Substituting γ_3 into $\gamma_1(v)$, we have

$$\gamma_1(v) = \frac{1}{2}(1-\delta)(1-v)(v(c(v_1-2)+2) - cv_1).$$

The transversality condition $\gamma_1(0) \leq 0$ is satisfied. The first-order condition $\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial u} = 0$ is also satisfied for $v \leq v_1$. Let G denote the function $((W')^{-1})'$. We have

$$\begin{aligned} -\frac{\delta}{1-\delta} \int_{v_1}^1 \frac{\dot{x}_2}{s} ds &= -\frac{\delta}{(1-\delta)} \int_{v_1}^1 G \left(1 - c + \frac{c}{2} \left(v_1 - \frac{v_1}{s^2} \right) \right) \frac{cv_1}{s^3} \frac{1}{s} ds \\ &= -\frac{\delta}{(1-\delta)} \int_{v_1-1/v_1}^0 G \left(1 - c + \frac{c}{2}x \right) \frac{c}{2} \sqrt{1 - \frac{x}{v_1}} dx. \end{aligned}$$

The last equality is obtained by the change of variables. As v_1 decreases, $v_1 - 1/v_1$ decreases and $\sqrt{1 - x/v_1}$ increases. Therefore, the left-hand side of (30) indeed increases as v_1 decreases.

We continue with case one. From (28) and (29), we can solve for γ_3 and $\gamma_1(v)$

$$\begin{aligned}\gamma_3 &= 1 + c \left(\frac{v_1(2v_2 - 1)}{v_2^2} - 2 \right), \\ \gamma_1(v) &= \frac{1}{2}(\delta - 1) \left(v \left((v - 2) \left(c \left(\frac{v_1(2v_2 - 1)}{v_2^2} - 2 \right) + 1 \right) - 2c + v \right) + cv_1 \right).\end{aligned}$$

It is easily verified that $\gamma_1(0) \leq 0$, $\gamma_1(1) \leq 0$, and the first-order condition $\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial u} = 0$ is satisfied. Equation (27) can be rewritten as

$$-\frac{\delta}{1 - \delta} \int_{v_1}^{v_2} \frac{\dot{x}_2}{s} ds = -\frac{\delta}{(1 - \delta)} \int_{v_1}^{v_2} G \left(1 - c + \frac{c}{2} \left(\frac{v_1(2v_2 - 1)}{v_2^2} - \frac{v_1}{s^2} \right) \right) \frac{cv_1}{s^3} \frac{1}{s} ds = 1.$$

For any $v_1 \leq v_1^*$, there exists $v_2 \in (v_1, 1)$ such that (27) is satisfied. ■

Transfers with Limited Liability. Here, we consider the case in which transfers are allowed but the agent is protected by limited liability. Therefore, only the principal can pay the agent. The principal maximizes his payoff net of payments. The following lemma shows that transfers occur on the equilibrium path when the ratio c/l is higher than 2.

Lemma 11 *The principal makes transfers on path if and only if $c - l > l$.*

Proof. We first show that the principal makes transfers if $c - l > l$. Suppose not. The optimal mechanism is the same as the one characterized in Theorem 1. When U is sufficiently close to μ , we want to show that it is “cheaper” to provide incentives using transfers. Given the optimal allocation (p_h, u_h) and (p_l, u_l) , if we reduce u_l by ε and make a transfer of $\delta\varepsilon/(1 - \delta)$ to the low type, the *IC/PK* constraints are satisfied. When u_l is sufficiently close to μ , the principal’s payoff increment is close to $\delta(c/l - 1)\varepsilon - \delta\varepsilon = \delta(c/l - 2)$, which is strictly positive if $c - l > l$. This contradicts the fact that the allocation (p_h, u_h) and (p_l, u_l) is optimal. Therefore, the principal makes transfers if $c - l > l$.

If $c - l \leq l$, we first show that the principal never makes transfers if $u_l, u_h < \mu$. With abuse of notation, let t_m denote the current-period transfer after m report. Suppose $u_m < \mu$ and $t_m > 0$. We can increase u_m ($m = l$ or h) by ε and reduce t_m by $\delta\varepsilon/(1 - \delta)$. This adjustment has no impact on *IC/PK* constraints and strictly increases the principal’s payoff given that

$W'(U) > 1 - c/l$ when $U < \mu$.⁴⁷ Suppose $u_l = \mu$ and $t_l > 0$. We can always replace p_l, t_l with $p_l + \varepsilon, t_l - \varepsilon l$. This adjustment has no impact on IC/PK and (weakly) increases the principal's payoff. If $u_l = \mu, p_l = 1$, we know that the promised utility to the agent is at least μ . The optimal scheme is to provide the unit forever. ■

⁴⁷It is easy to show that the principal's complete-information payoff, if $U \in [0, \mu]$ and $c - l \leq l$, is the same as \bar{W} in Lemma 1.